Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has long established himself as a tough autocrat and master of international manipulation. However, as the BBC writes, there are real factors that could influence his decision to continue the war against Ukraine - despite the fact that the Kremlin perceives the current diplomatic situation as favorable for itself.
Putin is convinced that Washington's position is changing in his favor after Donald Trump's victory in the US elections. This, as well as the local successes of the Russian army on the battlefield, only strengthens his confidence in the feasibility of maximalist demands: recognition of the occupied territories, Ukraine's refusal to join NATO and reduction of its army. According to some analysts, as long as the Kremlin does not see a threat to its plans, it has no motivation to negotiate.
One possible scenario, which the BBC draws attention to, is that Trump could try to force Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire on unfavourable terms. These include potential territorial concessions and the lack of security guarantees. In the event of a refusal, he has hinted that he could reduce support for Kyiv, including access to critical American intelligence that helps detect Russian drones and plan strikes on Russian military facilities.
In parallel, Europe is looking for its own options for influencing the situation. Under the auspices of the so-called "coalition of the willing," they are discussing the idea of creating an international military force to deter possible new Russian offensives, as well as broader financial commitments to restore Ukraine. A number of Western experts believe that Europe could be more actively involved in protecting Ukrainian airspace, in particular by expanding the "European Air Shield" to protect the country's western regions.
Some proposals — for example, the deployment of European military units in western Ukraine to relieve the burden on the Ukrainian army — have not yet found support from EU governments. The reason is traditional: fears of a direct clash with Russia or an escalation of the conflict. Despite this, as Keir Giles, a senior fellow at Chatham House, emphasizes, the West must stop being guided by the logic of fear:
«The only thing that will definitely stop Russian aggression is the presence of sufficiently strong Western forces where Russia plans to attack.».
Sanctions remain an equally noticeable factor. The Russian economy is working under significant pressure: inflation is reaching 8%, the key rate is at 16%, and real incomes are falling. Analysts note that the Kremlin has fewer resources for a long war than in 2022. However, it is the sanctions restrictions that the Russian Federation is able to partially compensate for — in particular, with the help of “shadow” oil exports via unregistered tankers.
An important tool would be the European Union's decision to use frozen Russian assets. This amounts to approximately 200 billion euros, which could form the basis of a "reparations loan" for Ukraine. The European Commission has already proposed a plan to attract 90 billion over two years, but there is no final decision - the EU will still hesitate.
As for Ukraine itself, according to the BBC, the country could realize a greater mobilization potential. The Ukrainian army remains one of the strongest and most technologically advanced in Europe, but almost four years of war have led to the depletion of personnel and an increase in cases of desertion. An additional factor of deterrence for Russia would be the increase in the production or import of long-range missiles - especially since Ukraine has already noticeably intensified strikes on targets deep in the Russian rear.
However, as Mick Ryan, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasizes, even this is not decisive:
«Deep blows are extremely important, but they alone will not force Putin to come to the negotiating table.».
China remains a separate variable. The Kremlin is heavily dependent on Chinese dual-use goods, and Xi Jinping is one of the few world leaders whose opinions Putin actually takes into account. If Beijing decides that war is no longer in its strategic interests, that could be one of the most powerful influences on the Kremlin’s behavior.
Thus, the BBC concludes: Putin's decision to continue the war is shaped by many factors - from the US position and European resolve to economic pressure and the role of China. But none of these elements has yet become critical to the changes in the Kremlin that allow Russia to continue the war.
