In Ukraine, there is increasing talk about the risk of an energy crisis this winter. MP Bondar warns: in December-January, the country may find itself in a situation where gas reserves will not cover the needs of the heating season. According to him, the threat concerns not individual regions, but the entire heat supply system - and this is a consequence not so much of an objective shortage of resources, but of managerial failure and corruption schemes around gas.
Similar warnings are not only coming from him. Other MPs have already publicly stated that the government understands the risk of gas shortages in January-February, especially if frosts below -15 hit. They are saying it in plain language: the country is entering the season with a lack of resources in storage facilities, and it will either have to postpone the start of heating or save heat administratively. According to one of the estimates, it will be necessary to find about another $3 billion to import more than 5 billion cubic meters of gas — and to do it now, before the peak of consumption.
The government is publicly trying to reassure. According to official statements, Naftogaz has almost completed the plan to pump gas into underground storage facilities, and by the start of the heating season, the storage facilities should have more than 13 billion cubic meters. The company is also taking out loans from state banks to buy additional imported gas and hedge against winter, explaining this by the consequences of Russian attacks on gas infrastructure.
But the official picture cracks where the economy begins. Naftogaz, which should be the financial and technical stabilizer of the industry, has turned, according to critics, into a center of multi-level manipulations with the price of the resource. This is a scheme based on the difference between the purchase and sale price. In November 2024, gas was purchased at about 33 hryvnias per cubic meter, while the average market price for the same period, according to the Ministry of Economy, was around 14.8 hryvnias per cubic meter (as the average value for the market, excluding VAT).
This expensive resource was then sold within the group at lower rates. This model creates an artificial loss at one end of the chain and a profit at the other. The loss is ultimately covered by the state — and the state, in our case, is taxpayers. In essence, we have a situation where citizens pay twice: first through energy bills, then through budget injections into the company, which explains the gaps by "social obligations."
Formally, Naftogaz management reports on its successes. At the end of 2024, the group reported almost 38 billion hryvnias in net profit, announced an increase in commercial gas production, and separately emphasized that it managed to get through the previous heating season despite Russia's massive attacks on the energy sector. This reporting was audited by KPMG, and it is presented as proof that the system is working.
But if we look not at the final figure of "profit", but at the mechanics, another question arises: at what price this profit was obtained and who actually controls the cash flows. And here comes into view JSC "Ukrgazvydobuvannya", which provides over 70% of Ukrainian gas production and is part of the "Naftogaz" group. After the change of management, the company is criticized for the fact that it has actually closed in on itself and works "for its own": contracts are given to close contractors, cheaper offers are cut off, competition is killed at the admission stage, and purchases are often made either outside open tenders altogether, or according to a procedure where the conditions are written out for a predetermined contractor. Such practices mean not just overspending on equipment or well service; they mean that the cost of Ukrainian gas is growing artificially, and debts are accumulating. This directly hits the argument "we produce our own gas and therefore guarantee stability."
Another important detail is production outside state-owned companies. Vitaliy Khomutynnik, who is called one of the key players in gas flows in the energy environment, has long been present in this market. According to information from the market, through a chain of controlled structures, he organized illegal production at the Sakhalin field with the subsequent sale of the resource bypassing state mechanisms and even with export to the EU. Schemes of this type always work the same way: the state loses rent and the volume of its resource, in return, individual private groups receive clean cash on Ukrainian natural gas, which in a moment of crisis should go to heat Ukrainian homes, and not be exported abroad. Officially, such actions are called “gray operations,” but in essence, we are talking about classic parasitism on a resource that is critically important in wartime.
This story hurts especially now. Because when the state says that it can delay the start of the heating season in order to “save gas,” it doesn’t just mean that the batteries will become warm later. It means that in the peak months — late January and February, when consumption is highest — the system will have to balance literally with “the volume of gas in the pipe,” and not with stocks in warehouses. And any additional blow to the infrastructure or delay in imports could turn this situation from a planned “we’re saving” situation into a force majeure situation of “we can’t physically supply heat.” This is the scenario described by some deputies and local mayors, who are already publicly calling for the start of heating to be postponed as late as the weather allows.
As a result, we have a paradox. On paper, Naftogaz demonstrates a profit and reports on readiness for the season. In reality, deputies talk about a gas shortage, the need to take out loans right now, the forced postponement of heating, and the fact that without systemic changes in the state energy sector, the country is entering the coldest months with nerves stretched to the limit.
