Economist Andrian Prokip talks about this and other consequences of the enemy attack.
NEW ATTACKS. PREPARE FOR HOLIDAYS
Last week, something happened that everyone should have been psychologically prepared for, but hoped would not happen - massive attacks on the power system. After the carefully planned attack on March 22 (and it was just that), smaller attacks were carried out for several days in a row.
The energy system suffered serious damage and losses. DTEK, for example, reports the loss of half of its capacity for a long period. Significant loss of part of DniproHES capacity. In fact, the balancing power suffered serious losses. Mostly losses in the frontline areas, but also in other regions significant damage and loss of capacities.
The gas infrastructure was also hit. And immediately the information attack will be aimed at the reliability of gas storage of non-residents in Ukrainian storage facilities.
- I previously wrote that we should expect an attack on the energy infrastructure before next winter, but I believed that they would come in the summer, when the energy system would be in the stage of an active repair campaign, and there could potentially be a shortage of capacity. The enemy decided to act earlier. On the one hand, their logic may be based on expectations regarding the exhaustion of our air defense, in the conditions of delayed aid from the USA - they decided not to wait for active deliveries of air defense systems and missiles to them to resume. On the other hand, the gap between the Russian elections and the inauguration of the new US president was an expected period of increased escalation (in short, Biden is bad for the Kremlin, but Trump is even worse, because he is unpredictable and can be more radical in pressure). So the enemy wants to force us into a freeze until a potential change of administration in Washington.
- The loss of large volumes of capacity makes us sharply dependent on imports. And, of course, significantly cuts all hopes for export. However, it cannot be ruled out that the government will return to the export ban in the event of a worsening of the situation. If it is premature or too long, it will be another blow to energy companies, which already lack funds for repairs. And the need for repairs, of course, grows with each shelling.
- We have become very close to blackout schedules. Currently, we are more or less stable through imports. However, a large part of consumers in Kharkiv and Odesa are still without electricity, and when they are connected, the total consumption will increase and the risk of shortages will be greater, and therefore - of schedules. This is not to mention the risk of additional damage due to shelling. But to a significant extent, the introduction of blackouts depends on us - whether we can show responsible consumption during peak hours. As much as possible, it is worth equalizing the consumption during the day, partially transferring it to the night, and not turning on powerful electrical appliances at the same time, especially during peak load hours. But if you or your neighbors are unable to do this, then schedules of disconnections, for example, emergency ones, can easily cope with this - quickly, without unnecessary conversations and persuasions. However, there will be no comfort.
- How to solve the problem of shortage? We need distributed generation, semi-peak and peak - high and low power, dispersed throughout the country. As well as the development of networks, in particular of a low voltage class, to increase the reliability of the system, which, accordingly, would be more difficult to disable with missile strikes. Perhaps, now it is worth not fantasizing about the future volumes of gas exports (and the head of "Naftogaz" Oleksiy Chernyshov recently spoke about this), but about how much it will be needed to ensure the operation of decentralized generation. Talking about how our exports will grow day by day looks like stubbornly ignoring the elephant in the room. Of course, exports are important for the economy. But let's just not guess, but take into account all the risks for the gas transportation system and storage facilities in the conditions of potential large-scale shelling. Reliability and continuity of energy supply is above all.
- In order to implement the decision to build a new small decentralized generation, we have almost everything, except incentives for the emergence of such generation. Administrative methods here, unfortunately (or fortunately), will not work. But as soon as there are economic incentives for investing in such capacities and infrastructure, it will begin to appear. This is, in particular, about the problem of debts in the market, and about price restrictions.
