There is a growing consensus in Ukrainian political discourse: the demographic hole and post-war reconstruction are pushing the country towards managed labor migration. Former Minister Dmytro Kuleba admits that "we may have to open the country to Bangladesh, Nepal, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam." KSE President and OP Advisor Timofiy Milovanov speaks of a critical shortage of personnel and warns: the import of workers is not counted in "tens of thousands, but in millions." Experts interviewed by the "Comments" portal explain how this will affect the economy, the return of Ukrainians, and social tension.
Ukraine is entering a phase when reconstruction will require massive hands — from the construction of hydroelectric power plants, ports and airports to the modernization of the railway. Political expert Volodymyr Tsybulko believes that the demand will be measured in millions of positions: foreign contractors (in particular, European and Turkish) will bring teams along with equipment; the domestic market will absorb additional workers in the construction complex. In his opinion, integration will not be a shock: existing communities are already accepting Ukrainian “rules of the game”, creating religious infrastructure without anti-state gestures and teaching the language.
Political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko calls for reducing the degree of dramatization. The demographic crisis is a fact, but the shortage will be localized, by region and specialty. The key shortage is engineers, highly qualified technical personnel, welders, and seasonal workers in the agricultural sector. Imports of specialists should be targeted, tailored to projects and taking into account qualifications. Some of the problems will be solved by the companies themselves: as is the case now at infrastructure facilities, general contractors will hire their own staff. At the same time, a pendulum of migration of Ukrainians is expected: after the borders open, many people will leave, but some will return, faced with the reality of labor markets abroad.
A separate factor is technology. According to Fesenko, within 5–10 years, automation and AI will reduce the need for a number of mass professions (in particular, in transportation), redistributing demand from “human hands” to “smart” systems. This will further push the state towards a targeted, rather than “gross,” immigration policy.
The social dimension is no less important than the economic one. With the growth of migration, anti-migrant sentiments will inevitably rise, especially in more conservative regions. Already, the language frictions between locals and migrants show how delicately integration policies will have to be built. The recipe is transparent admission rules, language requirements and compliance with the law, resettlement without “ghettos,” investments in education and vocational training, as well as honest communication about why the country needs these workers and for how long.
The coming decade will be defined by a combination of three things: managed immigration for specific projects, mass retraining of Ukrainians, and rapid automation of sectors. Without the first two, it will be difficult to maintain the pace of reconstruction; without the third, we will remain uncompetitive. Both the economy and the balance of Ukrainian identity in a new, more open Ukraine will depend on how the state combines these vectors.
