Military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets singles out seven reasons why the Russians managed to push the Armed Forces from Avdiivka. Too much in this operation was against the Ukrainian troops...
At the expense of Avdiivka...
At the moment, I do not see a particular need to describe the course of events related to the conduct of the SOU defensive operation in the area of Avdiivka . He is well known to everyone, so I cannot go into detail about where, how and who attacked, who and where defended (counterattacked) in one or another period of time.
All these events were repeatedly described not only by me, but also by other people. Therefore, in the course of formulating my conclusions and assessments, I will refer to the chronology of events only when they need to be illustrated or argued.
In my opinion, in the context of the overall assessment of the events in the Donetsk region, the most important and most appropriate thing to do is to determine the answers to two key questions - why the enemy, in the end, managed to achieve the goals set for themselves in this direction, albeit at a price that is not even worth in the term "significant" (rather, "zapredelnaya") and how it can be prevented in the future.
Of course, due to completely understandable reasons, I cannot fully, as it should, argue one or another of my conclusions regarding these events with specific data (for example, in the sense of assessing the real aspect ratio, their dislocation and location on the ground, as well as comment the decision of the Ukrainian command in certain situations, because the war is ongoing and it is not worth giving the enemy any information for evaluation), but, obviously, in two senses - the decision of the enemy command, as well as the assessment of individual factors that contributed to/impeded the actions of the troops ( forces) of the parties is quite possible.
And the second remark will concern the understanding of the scale of events that are evaluated. We will talk not only about the events that took place directly in and around the city of Avdiivka, but also about the neighboring sections of the LBZ. That is, everything that happened in the Avdiyiv direction...
So why?
At first glance, the reason is quite obvious and understandable to the vast majority of people who follow the course of events in the war. The enemy not only managed to concentrate in this direction by overwhelming forces, but also managed to realize this advantage. In particular, several factors at once:
Total number of troops
In this direction, the main forces of the enemy's 3 combined armies (ZVA) were operating in this direction: the 2nd, 8th (including almost the entire 1st Army Corps\AK) and the 41st + the main forces of a separate tank division ( 90-a td), not counting the whole scattering of forces and means, including from the category of "territorial troops" or "mobilization reserve".
According to various estimates, the total number of the enemy's troop group, which operated in this direction, was estimated at different time periods from 60-65 thousand v\sl to 80-82 thousand. Moreover, without taking into account the reserve component deployed in this direction and which by itself amounted to up to 10-12 thousand soldiers (up to 3 motorized rifle regiments\msp, 10 rifle and motorized rifle battalions, and 2-3 combined tactical units of the BARS type).
The advantage of the enemy in the number of the main types of weapons and military equipment (OMT),
concentrated in its parts and connections, which acted in this direction. The enemy had here - up to 450-460 tanks, up to 1,300 - 1,350 BBMs, up to 1,200 AS units, about 300 RSZV units...
In order to restore losses, the enemy managed to create a certain reserve of anti-tank missiles in this direction - up to 100 units of tanks, up to 220-230 units of self-propelled guns, up to 60 units of self-propelled guns and 25-30 units of anti-aircraft guns.
The enemy's advantage in the air
The enemy's aviation group, concentrated in this operational-tactical direction, consisted of up to 182 units of combat aircraft, up to 147 units of helicopters, of which 66-70 units were shock (fire support) units. Also, the enemy managed to deploy in this direction an echeloned (in height and range) system of military air defense, which, in the sense of its numbers, almost duplicated its actual needs...
Resource advantage of the enemy
It is obvious that in matters of supplying the troops with items of material and technical support, fuel, ammunition, spare parts, food, etc. the enemy had, in quantitative terms, much wider opportunities than the Ukrainian command.
At the time of the beginning of the Avdiiv offensive operation, the enemy managed to increase the rate of accumulation of stocks of these items by 10-15%, and during its implementation ensured an increase in their current supply by individual types and species up to 20%.
In addition, a number of other factors "played" in favor of the enemy...
It is a convenient district in the sense of logistical support for military operations
(an extensive system of communications, including equipped roadblocks and transport hubs, a large number of convenient places and objects for the location of warehouses and storage).
That is, the enemy had the opportunity to minimize the so-called "carriage shoulder" (both in terms of time and distance) in order to supply his troops operating in this direction with everything necessary for "life and combat".
In addition, his maneuvering of forces and means "along the front", as well as the movement of reinforcements and reserves, was also not limited or complicated by much...
The area where hostilities took place
in the sense of tank accessibility or the ability to quickly overcome it by troops, including vehicles, it also did not constitute a special obstacle, with the exception, apparently, of certain areas of the area with destroyed urban buildings, especially in the city of Avdiyivka itself.
Also, there were no wide water obstacles, nor areas with wide swamps or heavy forest areas...
Convenient drawing of LBZ
It is obvious that even during the formulation of the idea (plan) for this operation, the enemy command took into account the fact that it has the opportunity to occupy a convenient (comprehensive) starting position in relation to the Ukrainian troops who were defending in the Avdiyiv defense area.
This was facilitated by its occupation by troops before the Vodyane-Opytne border and the area of the village. Krasnohorivka
However, it is indisputable that for the successful implementation of the planned operation it is not enough to HAVE all these advantages, one must also be able to use them all...
