The increase of Russian military forces to 690,000 on the territory of Ukraine, according to military analyst Konstantin Mashovets, is a risky step for the Kremlin. This step may be futile without proper organizational measures and new approaches to warfare. However, the next six months promise to be extremely difficult. However, the real situation is much more complicated and depends on the methodology of using these forces. Let's consider the main points related to this hypothetical scenario.
Let's try to understand how it can affect the general (strategic) course of the war.
At first glance, the answer lies on the surface.
After all, the increase in the number of the Russian strategic group, which operates on the territory of Ukraine, will not bring us anything good, by default. Especially in the context of prospects for the enemy to continue active (in the sense of offensive) actions (operations) in the specified operational directions.
But in fact, the REAL, not PRETENDED, situation with this enemy group depends not only on its number, but on a whole series of factors. The main one is the methodology of its use.
In the previous two parts, I have expressed my own point of view regarding two main points related to this HYPOTHETICAL build-up of the enemy group:
- most likely, it is possible, mostly within the framework of the implementation of the next stage of mobilization deployment (mobilization) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Otherwise, either this increase will have to be stretched over time (then the deadline "by the end of 2024" will clearly not be met), or the size and scope of this increase will have to be significantly "reviewed" (and, accordingly, the plans related to its use );
- besides, in my opinion, the main purpose of increasing the number of the Russian strategic group in Ukraine is probably an attempt to move from permanent, positional forms of organization and conduct of hostilities to a series of more or less "deep" (at least operational level and scale) operations, with with the aim of ending the war as soon as possible (forcing Ukraine to accept the conditions formulated by Puil). Due to a number of reasons of a foreign and domestic political nature, the Kremlin began to HURRY, and therefore a long-term and large-scale war ceased to be a "convenient" strategy for its conduct.
Or, as an alternative reason for this increase in the number of the Russian strategic group in Ukraine, it is worth considering the desire of the Russian command already in the spring (summer) of next year to "parry" another attempt by Ukraine to change its war strategy from defensive to offensive.
And therefore, to prove to its military-political leadership (and, of course, its partner states) of all the "futility" of attempts to "change something" in the current military-political (strategic) situation in the war. That is, the impossibility of "returning something" or "repelling something". And this, according to the Kremlin, should obviously objectively encourage Ukraine and its allies to "agree" to all the Kremlin's "conquests".
In my opinion, the first version of the "main purpose" of the planned increase in the number of Russian troops in Ukraine announced by General Syrsky looks more likely than the second.
Simply because the "ideology" of the theory and practice of the Soviet-Russian "school" of military art requires the search and application of the most active and effective methods and methods of "resolute defeat of the enemy's troops."
The transition from a positional "pull-push" in the tactical zone with a more or less stable front line, with the hope that the enemy (the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ukraine in general) will somehow and someday "fall", to a series of "deep breakthroughs and captures", in this sensei is the most appropriate strategy.
If only because the Kremlin today simply “for itself” cannot guarantee with one hundred percent certainty that at some point the “hostile bourgeois” (which, by the way, collectively outweigh all the resource, economic and technological capabilities of the Kremlin) may stop helping Ukraine to wage a protracted war, even in addition with the "partial participation" of China).
At the same time, when trying to determine the nature of the impact of this increase in the number of Russian troops deployed in Ukraine on the general (military-political\strategic) situation in the war, it is worth noting only the strictly military (military) sphere, but a whole series of others, one way or another related to the Kremlin's ability to conduct it in general, or to "model" its strategy in it. For example, a financial, military-ECONOMIC component or social-political, technological, etc.
Regarding, actually, the military sphere.
This kind of increase in the number of the strategic group of Russian troops in Ukraine, which General Sirsky announced, will obviously contribute to the acquisition by his command of a whole list of opportunities and capabilities.
I will not list them all now, but I will name two, in my opinion, key, in the light of the above-described purpose of this build-up and the general course of the war, namely:
- acquisition by the Russian command of the opportunity to carry out the operational deployment of the relevant offensive groups of troops not only on 1-2 operational directions, as now, but at least on 3-4 (albeit on a relatively limited scale). 150-160 thousand "carcasses" is at least one additional grouping of troops (UA), quite comparable to such "monsters" as "West", "South", or "Center";
- the acquisition by the Russian command of the opportunity to increase the operational density of its troops (that is, to increase the average indicators of the number of personnel and combat equipment of the troops (forces) of its armies and army corps deployed in Ukraine and in the immediate vicinity of it), thanks to which not only echeloning the order of battle of its troops on a greater number of directions and sections, but also to start forming reserve components on a larger scale and more intensively (at the tactical and operational levels, with which they currently have, let's say, certain difficulties).
However, all this "beauty" makes sense only when the Russian command is really going to change the main forms and methods of using its troops in the war with Ukraine — from gradually "gnawing away" at the Ukrainian defense in the style of "landing to landing" to "striking and crushing blows" in the depth of the enemy's defense", or when there is a real need to "cement" one's own defense again with additional reserves in some operational direction, where, in his opinion, "the Armed Forces will try to advance again".
In all other cases, this increase will be meaningless. Because the increase of "live" (until a certain moment) force, which is involved only in order to have the opportunity to continue storming the "forester's house" or the "half-landing near Chasik" will only lead to the fact that even these "hypothetical" 150-160 thousand "will be sharpened" in the same way as their predecessors.
There is no difference for the "change in the general situation in the war" how many Russian servicemen died, for example, in the battles for Vovchansk - three, five, ten thousand, only the ratio between these losses and the "quality" (level, volume) of what was achieved plays a role result
If you invested (either in the ground or in a hospital bed) in frontal attacks in order to capture a third of the border town, about somewhere a full-blooded division, then if you do not change the very approach to this kind of your actions, but only increase the number of assault troops groups and mouths, then obviously you will achieve the desired success (if at all) at least not with less losses.
Let's summarize
The increase in the number of personnel of the Russian strategic group of troops deployed in Ukraine will certainly have a "sharply negative" effect on the general course of the war for you and me. After all, it will contribute to a significant expansion of the capabilities and capabilities of the Russian command of the appropriate level to plan, organize and CONDUCT certain actions (especially of an offensive nature).
However, the impact of this build-up on the general situation in the war is not limited to the military sphere at all. A number of OTHER factors "related" to this are important for her. Starting with the financial (because this ADDITIONAL pack needs to be clothed, fed, fed, and finally armed and equipped with something, these are funds, funds again and funds again), ending with social and political.
As of mid-February of this year, according to the publication "Left Bank", the Russian Federation ALREADY spent at least 1.3 TRILLION US dollars on the war with Ukraine (of which, at least 211 billion - only for the deployment and maintenance of its strategic group in the occupied territories troops, when it clearly did not reach 500,000 "heads", now it is more, and in the yard it is far from FIERCE). Adding another 150-160 thousand "carcasses" to this code means adding costs, and significant ones at that.
At the same time, in the Russian Federation itself, inflation continues to grow, industrial production, despite the simple "absurd injection of money" from the Russian budget into military production, continues to "slow down" (the growth rate, which was "provided" by the military industry there, initially stabilized and now gradually began to decrease, they are still growing, but less and less). Something is also wrong with the very deficit of the "swamp" budget, and in general, taxes on the "swamp" are drastically increasing.
And there is also a socio-political factor (these ADDITIONAL "heroes" for the fight against the "NATO-BINDERO Hydra" will have to be caught somewhere and someday, that is, mobilized, and this is unlikely to cause particularly positive feelings and emotions in Russian society).
Well, etc.
And finally, a short assessment of all this build-up in the style of "despite everything...".
We are dealing with the Kremlin's "last" attempt to change the "paradigm of war" in a strategic sense. That is, to achieve the REAL goal of the war — to eliminate Ukraine as a state.
The chosen method is time-stretched strangulation.
First, by military means, to force them to agree to the end of the war on their own terms (for this, in fact, this build-up is needed), after which Ukraine (or, better to say, in what remains of it), will obviously begin, according to the Kremlin, "irreversible social and political processes of a disintegrative nature" regarding its system of state administration and the entire state system (which is quite likely). In the end, the Kremlin will only have to "finish".
Therefore, we should prepare for a very dynamic and intense next 5-6 months. The Kremlin, in fact, is going all-in. His immediate and currently MAIN task is to force Ukraine to agree to THEIR results of the war.
