Russia's missile strikes on nuclear power plants in Ukraine have sparked global concern over the possibility of a nuclear disaster. The August 26 attack targeted nuclear power plants that provide more than 55% of Ukraine's electricity. Experts, including Mykhailo Honchar, are warning of serious risks and calling on the world to take urgent action to prevent a potential nuclear disaster.
Russia did not simply try to strike the United Energy System of Ukraine with a massive and combined missile and drone strike on August 26. These were targeted, but indirect actions aimed at striking Ukraine's nuclear power plants, which provide over 55% of the country's electricity production. Our nuclear power plants are an island of stability in Ukraine's energy sector.
What did Russia try to do? First, to knock out our power units without resorting to strikes directly at the nuclear power plant or at the distribution devices near the nuclear power plant, but by trying to destroy the peripheral substations. This is a kind of hybrid method of knocking out nuclear generation. Second, in parallel, Russia launched a powerful campaign of disinformation against the IAEA and discrediting Ukraine regarding the situation at the Kursk nuclear power plant.
The visit of the head of the IAEA, R. Grossi, to the Russian nuclear power plant in Kurchatov on August 27 was organized extremely promptly. Despite his statement that the Kursk nuclear power plant is operating in a “mode close to normal”, the head of Rosatom, Likhachev, presents his visit as an agreement “…on the immediate reaction of the IAEA to any manifestations of aggression both in Zaporizhia and in the Kursk region”, accusing the Armed Forces of Ukraine of shelling the nuclear power plant. Some other ambiguous statements by Grossi (regarding the risk of a nuclear incident, regarding the vulnerability of RBMK-type reactors) are interpreted by the Russian side as indicating that “the IAEA is on the side of Russia”.
Russia, acting indirectly, is trying to circumvent Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions: Article 56 “Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces”
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, in particular dams, dykes and nuclear power stations, shall not be the object of attack, even if these objects are military objectives, if such an attack could lead to the release of dangerous forces and, as a result, serious casualties among the civilian population. Other military objectives located on or near these works or installations shall not be the object of attack if such an attack could lead to the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and, as a result, serious casualties among the civilian population.
Detailed provisions on the security of dangerous objects during hostilities are contained in the above-mentioned First Additional Protocol of 1977 (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions, as well as in the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 (AP II) and customary international humanitarian law. Nuclear power plants are civilian objects and as such are protected from direct attack and reprisals (Art. 48 API; Rule 7 CI HL). In case of doubt as to whether a nuclear power plant is being used to make an effective contribution to the hostilities, it should be considered to be civilian (Art. 52(3) API), even in conflict zones (ICRC Commentary on API, para. 2034). The obligation of parties to an armed conflict to take constant care to protect the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects during all military operations (Art. 57(1) API; Rule 15 CI HL) is particularly important in the case of nuclear power plants. Given the risk of radiation release and subsequent severe consequences for the civilian population, the parties must exercise extreme caution during troop movements, maneuvers, and other military actions near such facilities.
What I don't see now is any official reaction from Ukraine. Especially since Russia is bluffing, because if the threat to the Kur NPP were real, they would have shut down two operating power units.
But our nuclear officials are once again eager for a major construction (read: theft), now at Chyhyryn. And at the same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry accuses Ukraine of “nuclear terrorism,” while its armed forces have seized and control the largest Ukrainian nuclear power plant, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not demonstrate any intentions to seize the Russian nuclear power plant during the Kursk operation.
However, again, from the official level, we do not see an adequate response and countermeasure to the racist nuclear blackmailers.
