The situation is not conducive to bold offensive operations by the Ukrainian army, military analyst Mykola Beleskov admits in a column for The Atlantic Council. Therefore, the only sensible plan for 2024 is a defensive one.
Russia’s full-scale invasion is approaching its two-year deadline, and it is vital for Ukraine’s military and political leadership to learn the lessons of 2022 and 2023.
The most important conclusion to be drawn from the last two years of fighting is the dominance of defensive warfare over offensive operations. This has been demonstrated many times, starting with the failure of the Russian blitzkrieg in the first month of the war.
The second key lesson is the importance of balancing political goals with military capabilities. Political considerations forced both Russia and Ukraine to launch offensives with insufficient forces, resulting in heavy casualties.
While Ukraine’s long-term goal remains to fully liberate the country from Russian occupation, current circumstances do not favor bold offensive operations. On the international front, US and EU aid commitments have faced serious political obstacles, while efforts to expand the production of military equipment and weapons are well behind schedule. There is growing concern in Ukraine about high casualties and potential labor shortages.
Given this, Ukraine’s military strategy for 2024 should focus on holding the front line and ensuring permanent control over the approximately 82% of the country’s territory that remains in Ukrainian hands. A strategic shift to active defense would be consistent with Ukraine’s current strength, buying valuable time to regroup and rearm in anticipation of what are likely to be more favorable conditions in 2025.
Importantly, a more defensive stance would allow Ukraine to exploit Moscow’s urgent need for victories. With the Russian army under immense political pressure to advance, Ukrainian commanders would have ample opportunity to steadily bleed Putin’s invasion forces, much as they are doing now at Avdiivka.
In parallel, Ukraine should seek to continue to degrade Russia’s ability to wage war by escalating its campaign of airstrikes on targets far beyond the front lines throughout occupied Ukraine and Russia itself. This could include attacks on troop concentrations, military bases and ammunition depots, as well as logistical centers and weapons production facilities.
By adopting an active defense strategy in 2024, Kyiv could achieve the dual goal of preventing any significant Russian advance and creating conditions conducive to Ukraine’s success in a war of attrition. This would set the stage for a return to offensive operations in 2025.
The effectiveness of any defense strategy in 2024 will depend largely on the level of support from Ukraine’s partners. In terms of arms supplies, priorities will include massive amounts of artillery ammunition, along with electronic warfare systems, strike drones, additional air defenses, and long-range missiles. The eagerly anticipated arrival of F-16 fighter jets in the coming months will also greatly enhance Ukraine’s ability to deny Russia control of the skies.
If this military assistance is provided, Ukraine will be able to implement an active defense strategy over the next year, as well as prepare for future offensives. This training should include expanded training programs for Ukrainian soldiers in NATO countries. While tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have already been trained in the first two years of the war, failures on the front lines in the second half of 2023 have exposed the shortcomings of these efforts. It is clear that much more time is needed to provide Ukrainian soldiers with the military knowledge and skills necessary for success on the battlefield.
The transition to active defense in 2024 will not prevent Ukraine from carrying out specific offensive actions. The most likely focus of Ukraine's offensive operations over the next year will be the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula. This was confirmed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a recent interview with The Economist.
The systematic destruction of Russian logistical and military capabilities in Crimea over the course of 2024 serves two important purposes. First, it would help ensure freedom of merchant shipping in the Black Sea, building on Ukraine’s recent progress in breaking through Russia’s naval blockade of ports. Second, it would hinder the Kremlin’s efforts to resupply the Russian army in southern Ukraine, potentially creating weak points along the front lines of a ground war.
Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea demonstrated the power of Western weapons combined with the skill and ingenuity of the Ukrainian military. Further breakthroughs in Crimea and at sea in 2024 will depend on the willingness of Ukraine’s partners to supply the necessary missiles.
Calls for Ukraine to adopt a defense strategy in the coming year are a far cry from the optimism that abounded in early 2023 after Ukraine’s resounding victories at Kharkiv and Kherson. While some observers will inevitably find this position pessimistic or even defeatist, it reflects the current realities of war and represents the most likely path to future success. Indeed, if Ukraine’s transition to active defense in 2024 paves the way for eventual victory, future historians will find it prudent and wise.
Vladimir Putin is openly preparing his country for a long war, emboldened by growing signs of weakness among Ukraine’s Western allies. To defeat the Kremlin dictator and end the threat posed by a resurgent Russian imperialism, Ukraine and its international partners must stop thinking in terms of individual attacks and adopt a longer-term approach to this historic task.
