It is unlikely that the Russians will attack Kharkiv, and even more so Kyiv, military analyst Konstantin Mashovets is sure. But in his opinion, the enemy will try to move on Kramatorsk-Slovyansk and Kurakhovo-Vugledar.
Assessment of possible (hypothetical) options for actions of the enemy army during the summer-autumn campaign of 2024. Let's try to understand - WHERE?
I can fully share the point of view that if the Russians themselves said “to Kharkiv,” or even “to Kyiv,” then, in fact, that is what will happen.
I can, but I don't share.
When planning and organizing a more or less large-scale offensive operation (at least at the operational level), it is obvious that the enemy command will be forced to take into account a number of OBJECTIVE factors, which those people who continue to claim that it will be "on Kharkiv" or "on Kyiv" think little about, or do not think at all:
- for example, about the difference in the size of the necessary (even calculated) troops/forces to organize and conduct an offensive, for example, on Toretsk and on the same Kharkiv;
- you just need to sit down and think – if in order to take Avdiivka, you need to regroup (concentrate) ADDITIONALLY two combined arms armies (CA) + almost a full-fledged separate tank division, not counting a bunch of other, smaller formations, then how many troops will you need to concentrate for an offensive operation on Kharkiv? On the other hand, even if somehow, as if you were a magician, you could find such a “strategic surprise” somewhere “up your sleeve”, then the question will quite seriously arise – how to stuff this strategic and pre-fed “rabbit” INSIGHTFULLY into your sleeve or top hat? In other words, how to carry out the process of operational deployment of the relevant offensive groups INSIGHTFULLY for the enemy and so as not to cause him premature alarm?;
- In addition, when choosing a future operational direction (zone) for your offensive, you need to take into account a whole bunch of factors - from the outlines of the front line (convenient\inconvenient), to the conditions and your own ability to ensure full-fledged material and technical support (MTS) of the advancing groups with all types of supplies (the ability to create an appropriate STOCKS of MTS items), even in the minimum necessary volumes, and the engineering layout of the area. You will need to take into account a lot - the weather, the terrain in the zone of the future offensive, the presence and density of the civilian population, etc. And most importantly - possible options and methods of counteraction from the enemy (the Armed Forces of Ukraine), who, of course, will also not melancholy observe the process of your operational deployment.
It is for this reason that it is worth putting yourself in the enemy's command position and trying to determine his logic for making appropriate decisions. Denying the enemy this kind of ability, believing that he makes appropriate decisions as he pleases, or "solely for political reasons", in my opinion is not a very reasonable way to determine the meaning and content of his further actions.
Below, I will try to list at least two operational directions that, in this context, at the CURRENT TIME, I consider to be the most likely directions for the enemy to conduct offensive actions of the appropriate level.
In my opinion, this is:
- conditional Kramatorsk-Slovyansk direction;
- conditional Kurakhovsko-Vugledarsky direction.
Of course, both have both “+” and “-” in this regard.
However, before we evaluate them, let's try to understand the more “general” strategic reasons for considering them:
- Both hypothetical directions fit into the general “strategic” concept of warfare by the current Kremlin regime, more or less clearly articulated by it – access to the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (referring specifically to the Eastern operational zone);
- in these directions, most of the entire “United Grouping of the Russian Armed Forces in the South-Western Theater of Operations” troops/forces are ALREADY deployed as part of the enemy’s groupings of forces (GTFs) “West”, “Center” and “South”). In total, this is 279-280 thousand troops/forces, which, in turn, entails a whole series of “bonuses and treats” for the enemy, in terms of planning, preparation and organization of future offensive operations, at least at the operational level;
- The defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces groups in these directions is capable of leading the enemy “to the near approaches” from the east to the key “triangle” Dnipro – Pavlograd – Zaporizhzhia, which in a strategic sense cannot but affect Ukraine’s further ability to wage war. And accordingly, bring the Kremlin closer to the “intermediate” goal of the war at this stage – obtaining a temporary truce on favorable terms for it. In contrast to the hypothetical “liberation of Kharkov”, during the implementation of which, it is quite possible to “break through”, given the volume and size of troops (forces) that will need to be used for this.
Now, specifically, regarding the directions
The elimination of the Kurakhovo-Vuhledarskyi salient (bridgehead) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will require the enemy to solve at least two preliminary tasks – to advance to the Kurakhovo area itself, and also to concentrate ONE MORE offensive group in the 29th ZVA strip (approximately, the Novomayorske - Shevchenko - Petrivka - Yevhenivka area). Moreover, in terms of size – no less than an army corps (AK), and according to a sober assessment – no less than another combined-arms army.
At this stage, it is obvious that the enemy is ALREADY partially solving these tasks. In particular, its 8th ZVA, with the forces of the 1st AK, the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (msd), with the active participation of additional forces and means - the 155th separate marine brigade (abr MP) and the 39th separate motorized rifle brigade (omsbr) of the 68th AK, is persistently trying to break through in the direction of Maryinka - Georgiyivka (in the general direction of Kurakhovo) and significantly reduce this bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the north (through Pobeda, along the Maryinka - Vugledar road) and in the direction of Novomykhailivka - Kostyantynivka.
The current meaning of these actions is quite clear - to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw BEYOND the Marinka - Vugledar road along its entire length. However, in my opinion, there is no doubt that if the enemy achieves the previous goals I mentioned (especially regarding the breakthrough to the Kurakhovo area), the Russian command will obviously begin to consider the possibilities and chances of conducting a "deeper" operation in this direction... for example, through the area of the village of Uspenivka.
Moreover, it is obvious that active actions in this direction are of an “urgent” nature for the enemy. The further “overhang” of this bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over communications in the Donetsk-Mariupol, Donetsk-Volnovakha directions (and, accordingly, the existence of the possibility of inflicting damage on them, including the city of Mariupol itself, the distance from the advanced positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to its northern outskirts is about 63-65 km, and the city of Volnovakha, the corresponding indicator is 16-17 km, with a fairly wide range of firepower) is very “not to the liking” of the enemy.
Therefore, the need to conduct active, offensive actions in this direction is urgent for him.
In turn, in terms of the process of operational deployment of offensive groups, this direction is quite convenient, of course, to a certain extent (it will not work to hide it, the terrain, both on the front line and in the tactical and operational rear, is quite open and, accordingly, “subject to high-precision strikes by the enemy with long-range weapons”).
But, in terms of the availability of convenient communications (including road communications for maneuvering along the front and regrouping), as well as comprehensive transportation and accumulation of MTZ items, including the sea option, through the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, there is a fairly extensive network.
Moreover, the enemy has the opportunity to conduct a process of operational deployment of its offensive groups in this direction, relying on the first position of its main defense line, which stretches from Novopetrikivka to Volnovakha and from Volnovakha to Oleksandrivka.
The only, but quite significant, difficulty is that all this will have to be transported mainly by road, the railway network is small here, and its areas of operation are quite limited, and mostly, it is also “subject to the possibility of enemy strikes with long-range weapons.”.
The main enemy MTZ hubs in this sense are Dokuchayevsk, Volnovakha, Starobeshevo, Petrivskyi district of Donetsk, Yegorivka.
Now, regarding the assessment/calculation of the amount of troops(forces) required to accomplish this task (access to the Dachne-Shakhtarske line).
In my opinion, the enemy, at least based on the experience of past "operations" of the Russian command, will need to create 2 ADDITIONAL groups (in addition to the troops already deployed in this direction of the 8th and 29th ZVA with additional forces and means).
Approximately, in the combined arms army (of course, in the current, modern Russian understanding of this term) each.
To do this, there are currently, according to a sober assessment, exactly 2 ways:
- regroup the appropriate amount of troops from another direction to this direction, i.e. from the ALREADY operating strategic command of the Russian Armed Forces (as was the case with Avdiivka);
- or use strategic reserves, which are currently "only being formed and deployed", and the issue of the REAL timing of their acquisition of combat and operational capabilities, let's say, looks, to put it mildly, debatable.
In my opinion, the first option is more realistic than the second.
Mainly because of the main factor – time.
In this sense, it is much shorter, more effective, and allows for the use of a smaller amount of forces and resources than the second (which, in turn, will allow the use of the same strategic reserves, but not in full, which is quite difficult to do, but partially).
