It is hardly worth expecting the Russians to attack Kharkiv, and even more so Kyiv, a confident military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets. But the enemy, in his opinion, will try to move on Kramatorsk-Slovyansk and Kurakhovo-Vugledar.
Assessment of possible (hypothetical) options for actions of the enemy army during the summer-autumn campaign of 2024. Let's try to understand - WHERE?
I can fully share the point of view that if the Russians themselves said "to Kharkiv", or even "to Kyiv", then, in fact, it will be so.
I can, but I don't share.
When planning and organizing a more or less large-scale offensive operation (at least at the operational level), it is obvious that the enemy's command will be forced to take into account a number of OBJECTIVE factors in one way or another, about which those people who continue to claim that it will be "in Kharkiv" ” or “to Kyiv”, think little or not at all:
- for example, about the difference in the size of the necessary (even estimated) troops/forces for organizing and carrying out an offensive, for example, on Toretsk and the same Kharkiv;
- you just have to sit down and think - if in order to take Avdiivka, you need to regroup (concentrate) ADDITIONALLY two combined armies (ZVA) + almost a full-fledged separate tank division, not counting a bunch of other, smaller formations, then how many troops will you have do you need to focus on Kharkiv for an offensive operation? On the other hand, even if somehow, as if you are a fakir-magician, you can find this kind of "strategic surprise" somewhere "up your sleeve", then a very serious question arises - how to stuff this strategic and previously fattened "rabbit" INVISIBLE into your sleeve or a cylinder? In other words, how to carry out the process of operational deployment of the relevant offensive groups INVISIBLE to the enemy and in such a way as not to cause him premature alarm?;
- in addition, when choosing the future operational direction (zone) for your offensive, you need to take into account a whole bunch of factors - from the contours of the front line (convenient\inconvenient), to the conditions and one's own ability to ensure the implementation of full-fledged material and technical support (MTZ) of the advancing groups of all types rations (the ability to create an appropriate STOCK of MTZ items), even if only in minimally necessary volumes, and engineering arrangement of the area. Many things will need to be taken into account - the weather, the topography of the area in the lane of the future offensive, the presence and density of the civilian population, etc. And the main thing is possible options and methods of countermeasures by the enemy (the Armed Forces), who, of course, will not melancholicly observe the process of your operational deployment either.
It is with this in mind that it is worth putting yourself in the position of the enemy's command and trying to determine his logic of making relevant decisions. Denying the adversary this kind of ability, believing that he makes relevant decisions as he pleases, or "exclusively for political reasons", in my opinion, is not a very smart way of determining the meaning and content of his further actions.
Below, I will try to indicate at least two operational directions that, in this context, at THIS TIME, I consider to be the most likely directions for the enemy to carry out offensive actions of the appropriate level.
In my opinion, it is:
- conditional Kramatorsk-Slovyansky direction;
- conditional Kurakhovsko – Ugledarsky direction.
Of course, both have both “+” and “-” in this regard.
However, before we evaluate them, let's try to understand the more "general" strategic reasons for considering them:
- both hypothetical directions are included in the general "strategic" concept of waging war by the current Kremlin regime, more or less clearly articulated by it - access to the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (referring specifically to the Eastern operational zone);
- in these directions, most of the entire "United Grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the South-Western Military District" of the troops/forces is ALREADY deployed as part of the enemy's troop groups "West", "Center" and "South". In total, this is 279-280 thousand military personnel, which, in turn, entails a number of "bonuses and plushies" for the enemy, in the sense of planning, preparation and organization of future offensive operations, at least at the operational level;
- the defeat of the Armed Forces groups in these directions is able to bring the enemy "close approaches" from the east to the key "triangle" of Dnipro - Pavlograd - Zaporizhzhia, which in a strategic sense cannot but affect the further ability of Ukraine to wage war. And accordingly, to bring the Kremlin closer to the "intermediate" goal of the war at this stage - obtaining a temporary truce on terms favorable to it. In contrast to the hypothetical "liberation of Kharkov", during the implementation of which, it is quite possible to "break down", taking into account the volume and size of troops (forces) that will be needed for this.
Now, specifically, regarding directions
The liquidation of the Kurakhovo-Ugledarsky salient (the bridgehead) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will require the enemy to solve at least two previous tasks - to advance to the Kurakhovo district itself, and also to concentrate ONE MORE offensive group in the lane of the 29th ZVA (approximately the Novomayorske - Shevchenko - Petrivka - Yevgenivka district). Moreover, the size is not less than an army corps (AK), and according to a sober assessment, it is not less than another combined army.
At this stage, obviously, the enemy is ALREADY partially solving these tasks. In particular, his 8th ZVA, with the forces of the 1st AK, 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (msd), with the effective participation of additional forces and means - the 155th separate marine infantry brigade (rep. MP) and the 39th of a separate motorized rifle brigade (omsbr) of the 68th AK is persistently trying to break through in the direction of Maryinka - Georgiyivka (in the general direction to Kurakhovo) and significantly reduce this bridgehead of the Armed Forces from the north (via Pobyeda, along the Maryinka - Vugledar road) and in the direction Novomykhailivka - Kostyantynivka.
The current meaning of these actions is quite clear - to force Ukrainian troops to move BEYOND the Maryinka - Ugledar road along its entire length. However, in my opinion, there is no doubt about the fact that if the enemy achieves the previous goals I mentioned (especially regarding the breakthrough to the Kurakhovo region), the Russian command will obviously begin to consider the possibilities and chances of conducting a "deeper" operation in this direction ...for example, through the district of Uspenivka village.
Moreover, it is obvious that active actions in this particular direction are of an "urgently urgent" nature for the enemy. The further "overhang" of this bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over communications in the directions of Donetsk - Mariupol, Donetsk - Volnovakha (and, accordingly, the existence of the possibility of inflicting damage on them, including the city of Mariupol itself, the distance from the advanced positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to its northern outskirts is about 63-65 km and the city of Volnovakha, the corresponding figure is 16-17 km, with a sufficiently wide range of firearms) well, the enemy really "doesn't like it".
Therefore, the need to carry out active, offensive actions in this direction is urgent for him.
In turn, in the sense of the process of operational deployment of offensive groups, this direction is quite convenient, of course, to a certain extent (especially to hide it - it will not work, the terrain, both on the front edge and in the tactical and operational rear - is sufficiently open and, accordingly, "subjected to high-precision strikes by the enemy with long-range means").
However, in terms of the availability of convenient communications (including rolling ones, for maneuvering along the front and regrouping), as well as comprehensive delivery and accumulation of MTZ items, including the sea version, through the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk - there is a sufficiently extensive network.
Moreover, the enemy has the opportunity to carry out the process of operational deployment of his offensive groups in this direction, relying on the first position of his main line of defense, which stretched from Novopetrikivka to Volnovakha and from Volnovakha to Oleksandrivka.
The only, but rather significant, difficulty is that all this will have to be transported mainly by motor vehicles, there is little railway network here, and the directions of its operation are quite limited, and mostly, it is also "subject to the possibility of long-range enemy strikes."
The main nodal points of the enemy's MTZ in this sense are Dokuchaevsk, Volnovakha, Starobeshevo, Petrivskyi district of Donetsk city, Yehorivka.
Now, regarding the assessment/calculation of the amount of troops(forces) needed to carry out this task (exit to the border Dachne – Shakhtarske).
In my opinion, the enemy, at least based on the experience of past "operations" of the Russian command, will need to create 2 groups ADDITIONALLY (to the troops already deployed in this direction by the 8th and 29th ZVA with attached forces and means).
Approximately, in the combined army (of course, in the current, modern Russian understanding of this term) everyone.
For this, there are currently, according to a sober assessment, exactly 2 methods:
- to regroup in this direction the appropriate amount of troops from another direction, i.e. from the composition of the STILL active strategic military forces of the Russian Federation (as was the case with Avdiivka);
- or take advantage of the strategic reserves, which are now "only being formed and deployed", and the question of the REAL terms of their acquisition of combat and operational capabilities, let's say, looks debatable, to put it mildly.
In my opinion, the first option is more realistic than the second.
Mainly due to the main factor - time.
In this sense, it is much shorter, more effective and allows using a smaller amount of forces and means than the second (which, in turn, will allow using the same strategic reserves, but not in full\which is quite difficult to do, but partially) .
