Russia's war against Ukraine, now in its third year, is far from over. Both sides – the Kremlin and the Ukrainians – have shown determination to continue the fight.
The American magazine Foreign Policy interviewed prominent analysts about their predictions for the conclusion of this war, and so far they see no end in sight.
Professor Angela Stent, author of the book “Putin's World. Russia and its Leader through the Eyes of the West,” argues that the current situation in Ukraine has no obvious solutions.
Ukraine needs to mobilize more military resources, but given its smaller population, this may be difficult. The armed forces of both sides have their own problems - Russia purchases weapons from various countries, while Ukraine depends on support from Europe and the United States.
The European Union recently approved $54 billion in financial aid for Ukraine, which will allow it to continue functioning. However, the United States remains the main donor. If Congress does not approve the $60 billion in aid, American military support could be limited.
The chances of peace talks in 2024 are very slim, and neither side will win a decisive victory. The Kremlin is only willing to see Ukraine surrender, while Ukrainian leaders will not agree to such terms.
Predictions for an end to the conflict include the possibility of a Korean model with a truce and Western security guarantees for Ukraine. However, with Putin or his followers who share his views remaining in power, this is unlikely.
The Second Cold War: New Realities and Geopolitical Changes
China expert Jo Inge Beckevold notes that when Russian troops invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it was a clear signal of the accelerating geopolitical divide between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Sino-Russian axis on the other.
In 2024, this divide grows even more, reminiscent of the Cold War situation.
First, the war has increased Beijing’s influence over Moscow. Isolated from the West, Moscow depends on China as a market for its exports, a supplier of goods, and a partner in the development of new technologies. Beijing’s support for Moscow has exacerbated the divide between China and Europe, which has rejected China’s peace plan for Ukraine and has seen Beijing lose influence in Central and Eastern Europe.
Europe is now trying to escape its previous dependence on Russian energy resources by strengthening close ties with China. At the same time, Beijing is seeking to increase its self-sufficiency.
Russian aggression has also strengthened transatlantic unity, forcing European NATO members to increase their defense spending, drawing Finland and Sweden into the alliance, and prompting the United States to increase its military presence in Europe.
All these developments point to a new reality, different from the first Cold War. Today, the Sino-Russian partnership has a stronger geopolitical foundation than the former Sino-Soviet one. However, transatlantic unity remains fragile, with signs of rupture.
Individual cases may not threaten Western unity, but together they have a significant impact. After all, former US President Donald Trump called into question NATO's Article 5, openly expressing doubts about the US commitment to the defense of European allies.
Thus, Russia's attack on Ukraine exposed the weakness of the Western bloc. Europe still seems to have not fully understood the realities of war, whether it is Russian aggression or a new Cold War.
During the Cold War, the United States was able to exploit the differences between Beijing and Moscow. Today, these two states are in a stronger position and can influence the Western bloc.
Sanctions do not have an instant effect: a two-year analysis
Agata Demare, a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine and a senior fellow for geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations, draws attention to the results of two years of Western financial and economic sanctions against Russia.
She highlights three key points.
First, Moscow is waging an information war against sanctions, which has led to a general perception around the world that they are ineffective. However, this raises the question: if sanctions are ineffective, why is the Kremlin so actively promoting their discrediting?
The media also often emphasizes how Russia circumvents sanctions. Illegal imports exist, but the real situation is more complex than it seems. The volume of Russian high-tech imports has decreased by about 40% compared to the previous period before the imposition of sanctions, when Russia's need for high-tech is probably highest.
This is not enough to stop Moscow’s military actions, and more efforts are needed to tighten export controls. But the 40 percent reduction remains a significant, if understated, success of the sanctions.
Second, the impact of sanctions on Russian businesses is becoming increasingly visible, especially in sectors that have lost access to Western equipment and technology. For example, Siberian airline S7 was forced to suspend the operation of Airbus aircraft due to a lack of engine parts, and Lukoil stopped installing a cracker due to the breakdown of Western equipment. Such cases are expected to become more frequent in 2024, demonstrating that sanctions are a marathon, not a sprint.
Third, Ukraine's financial problems could be solved by using Russian assets frozen in the West. However, this issue is causing controversy among the allies. The US and Britain are in favor of confiscating these assets and transferring them to Ukraine, considering it a moral necessity, while some EU countries are resistant to this idea for fear of undermining trust in the Western financial system.
