In the two years since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the nature of the war and predictions about its further development have undergone significant changes.
In the first year of the war, Ukraine relied on support and military supplies from the United States and Europe, preparing for the expected offensive by Russian troops. However, over time, the situation changed, and the war entered a stage of positional struggle. Western support decreased, and Russian troops, having received reinforcements, expanded their positions on several front lines.
Despite these changes, the conflict continues in a war of attrition format, where the front remains almost unchanged. The question of what might happen next and what factors might influence the course of this war remains open.
New weapons – drones
One of the new elements in the war has been unmanned systems, which are being used extensively by both sides. In particular, in the initial stages of the conflict, Turkish Bayraktar drones played a key role in conducting reconnaissance and attacks on Russian troops.
Later, small kamikaze drones, reconnaissance or attack copters, appeared on both sides of the front, becoming an effective tool for both sides. Russia and Ukraine introduced medium-sized drones that can carry out strikes hundreds of kilometers behind enemy lines.
Another recent trend is FPV drones, which have become a real problem for both sides. These are high-speed drones that the operator controls through goggles or a first-person view screen. At the end of January, near Novomykhailivka, Ukrainian operators were able to repel an attack by Russian armored vehicles for the first time almost exclusively with the help of FPV drones.
At sea, unmanned boats used by the Ukrainian Navy have forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to divert some of its ships from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, limiting their operations. Since February 24, 2022, such Ukrainian boats have damaged and sunk several Russian ships, including the large landing ship Caesar Kunikov, and severely damaged the Kerch Bridge.
The main advantages of these remote or autonomous control systems are their low cost and availability, which has made them widespread, as well as their efficiency.
In the 1940s, remotely controlled aircraft and tanks already existed, but only with mass production, affordable prices, and reliability did they become a serious threat to infantry and equipment on land and ships at sea.
Currently, Russia and Ukraine are actively purchasing components for aerial drones from China, sometimes competing for batches of goods.
Many experts discuss the fact that drones, both naval and aerial, are changing the nature of modern warfare. However, some opinions are overly optimistic due to the novelty effect. The emergence of new effective weapons always generates hopes of an easy victory.
However, this does not fully reflect reality. Drones cannot capture territory; this requires infantry and armored vehicles. Thus, traditional types of weapons are still an integral part of military operations.
In particular, with the advent of drones, electronic warfare (EW) equipment began to develop actively, as well as rapid-fire artillery with shells that can operate at long distances. Although such equipment existed before, with the advent of drones, their improvement has become extremely relevant.
One of the newest trends in drone development is the use of autonomous optoelectronic target recognition systems that do not require a signal or a navigator, and, accordingly, cannot be suppressed by electronic warfare systems. In addition, drones are learning to operate in swarms, which complicates their fight.
At sea, unmanned boats have also attracted attention for their effectiveness, fueling discussions about their role in naval warfare. However, such boats have their limitations, such as low range and limited cruising range.
Even if the unmanned boats used by Ukraine can operate at a distance of more than 800 kilometers, this may not be enough to create a full-fledged fleet in distant sea areas.
Large ships can be successfully defended with rapid-fire artillery, machine guns, and thermal imaging at close range. Radar, patrol aircraft, and naval patrols will help detect attacks by naval drones at long range.
Although countermeasures against naval and aerial drones are known, unmanned and unmanned systems still have the advantage. Their widespread use makes countermeasures more difficult.
Unmanned boats have already forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to scale back its activities. Ukraine is investing heavily in their development, and attacks are becoming more frequent.
A side that can create a large army of drones — much larger than it currently has — will be able to change the situation on the front, greatly increasing the enemy's losses, especially in equipment.
Fighters
Ukraine is making efforts to obtain Western fighter jets from 2022.
Now Denmark and the Netherlands have promised to deliver more than 60 F-16 aircraft. Ukrainian pilots have already begun training to fly these aircraft, but the exact date of completion of training and the start of their use is still unknown. This will probably happen in the spring or summer of 2024. Previously, the possibility of supplying the Ukrainian army with Swedish JAS 39 Gripen fighters was considered, which also meet the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - these are modern aircraft that can use a variety of European-made ammunition.
While Ukrainian officials claim that the aircraft are critical to effectively confronting Russia, details regarding their use and operational plans remain confidential.
Fighter jets can be used to strike ground or sea targets, conduct air combat, counter air defense, intercept cruise missiles and drones, suppress air defenses, and perform other tasks. These capabilities are extremely important for Ukraine.
For example, during the intensification of military operations in Avdiivka, Russian troops received assistance from VKS fighter-bombers, which carried out attacks with high-explosive aerial bombs on targets on the front lines.
If the Armed Forces of Ukraine had fighters with air-to-air missiles of the appropriate range, they could effectively prevent such bombings.
For example, during the summer offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russian Ka-52 helicopters encountered significant resistance from Ukrainian aviation, which complicated their operations.
Ukrainian fighters could also provide support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces ground forces by striking Russian targets.
Some experts doubt the importance of even a few dozen such aircraft in a war. However, if there are a significant number, they could become a significant factor.
One of the Russian aviation experts, who later remained anonymous, noted in a conversation with the BBC a few months ago that the Armed Forces of Ukraine could become a serious force in confronting the Russian Aerospace Forces if Ukraine had at least 200 fighter jets.
An important factor in this context is numbers. A large number of fighters can significantly change the situation in a military theater of operations.
Much will depend on what weapons will be delivered with the planes. The American F-16A fighters, which are in service with the Danish and Dutch air forces, are not the newest machines. Some of them were put into service in the first half of the 1980s. This means that their radars and other onboard systems are outdated. However, they can be modernized.
Ukrainian pilots have been using rather old MiGs and Sus since the very beginning of the war, and the F-16A is an effective aircraft that surpasses the MiG-29 in many respects.
In addition, a large number of Western fighters would play a significant role - it would at least somehow compensate for obsolescence.
Another important aspect is the ability of pilots to effectively use aircraft in combat, as well as the planning of operations by the headquarters of aviation units.
If all these factors coincide, the course of the war will change - Russian aviation will feel even less confident near the front line.
Foreign military aid
Delays in the delivery of Western ammunition and weapons have already weakened the Ukrainian army at the front.
According to an analytical material published on February 16 by the Institute for the World Economy at Kiel University, by this point, the United States' promises of assistance and actual military supplies to Ukraine have effectively ceased due to the lack of new aid packages in the US Congress.
At the same time, aid from the European Union continues to grow, although, according to analysts at the institute, there is a gap in Europe between promises and actual assistance provided, including ammunition.
According to the report, as of January 15, 2024, the European Union and its member states had allocated a total of 144 billion euros in aid to Ukraine, but of this amount, only 77 billion euros were spent on specific purposes, in particular on ammunition.
Last March, the EU approved a plan to supply one million 155mm shells to Ukraine within a year. These shells are used in all heavy artillery of NATO countries.
The Ukrainian army is already experiencing a shortage of shells, and this could affect military operations on the front. If the US fails to resolve the political issue of aid to Ukraine, and European countries fail to make up for the shortfall in American supplies, this could lead to further deterioration of the situation.
Despite the use of high-tech weapons systems, the military conflict in Ukraine remains a war of numbers, and therefore any reduction in resources for waging war could negatively affect the situation.
Mobilization
In a war of numbers, the number of groups on the front plays no less important a role than the availability of sufficient ammunition.
The situation on the front is currently characterized by stability, as neither side can launch a decisive offensive, mainly due to a lack of personnel and equipment. This applies to both Russia and Ukraine, and could lead to a new wave of mobilization.
Earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the possibility of mobilizing 450,000-500,000 people in 2024. However, this initiative still requires justification from the military command.
Ukraine is considering a bill that would simplify mobilization and lower the age threshold for conscripts to 25. However, the adoption of this law is currently being finalized due to the large number of proposed amendments.
The possibility of such a large-scale mobilization in Ukraine would allow for the staffing of new units and the demobilization of military personnel who have been participating in the war since the beginning of the conflict.
Russia is also facing problems with the size of its army, although this issue has not been addressed in legislative initiatives. The protest movement of wives of conscripts in Russia indicates the public's distrust of the authorities, which could lead to further mobilization.
Mobilization is needed by both the Ukrainian and Russian armies, as front-line units need regular rest and renewal of military personnel due to physical and psychological exhaustion.
An increase in the number of troops at the front could lead to increased tension in the war zone and affect the course of the war in both countries.
Economy
While Europe is undergoing restructuring and the slow reorganization of the military-industrial complex, the Russian economy has shown some positive indicators. In 2023, it even began to grow.
One reason for this stability is the significant budget expenditures. The government allocates significant funds for the needs of the war, and this money is distributed throughout the economy.
Russia is also investing in expanding its military production. Many factories have increased the number of shifts and are building or have already built new production facilities.
At the same time, Russia purchases weapons abroad, such as Iranian drones, and also purchases ammunition from the DPRK.
However, such a militarized economy, dependent on budget money, is already starting to overheat and will probably not be able to grow at the same pace for long. The Central Bank of Russia stated this as early as 2023.
European officials, who do not want to be named, told the BBC that the European Union's strategy for confronting Russia is not so much relying on sanctions as on the Russian economy failing to withstand the pressure of the war.
“So far, the Russian economy is still afloat, but it is already clear that war spending has begun to consume a significant part of the budget, which previously went to social needs, education, and medicine. However, we have a large reserve of time — until mid-2025, but then we expect a serious financial crisis in the Russian economy,” said one of them.
The economic crisis itself will not change the course of the war, but it may affect the Russian leadership's desire to continue the conflict.
Currently, the final outcome of the war, just like its beginning, depends on political decisions.
