How to further develop the Ukrainian energy sector during the war, asks economist Volodymyr Omelchenko. Of course, Ukraine needs a new nuclear generation, but there are nuances.
DOES UKRAINE NEED TO BUILD NEW NPP UNITS?
I have always supported the idea that Ukraine will not be able to achieve the goals of the energy transition and ensure sufficient capacity for economic development without increasing renewable energy generation, building new nuclear units, and creating modern flexible generation and energy storage systems.
Ukraine has already lost about 16 GW of capacity during the Russian aggression . It should also be taken into account that the majority of thermal generation facilities have long since expired their service life. Our energy sector, in the apt expression of former Energy Minister Ivan Plachkov, resembles a museum of technology from the 60s - 80s, which is similar to the automobile fleet of Cuba, characterized by the achievements of the American auto industry of the pre-revolutionary period.
Today, the Unified State Electric Power System has no capacity reserves, and those old TPPs inherited from the USSR are in a state of emergency due to asset wear and tear and destruction by Russian missiles and drones. Therefore, the existing energy capacities are not only unable to provide electricity for the future recovery of the economy, but also an acceptable level of energy supply reliability during the war period, when a huge number of enterprises lie in ruins.
As is known, the current OGP of Ukraine is at a satisfactory level, largely due to the warm winter and electricity imports. In such a situation, it seems that the rational solution is to use funds for the repair of existing infrastructure and the implementation of decentralized projects that can start generating electricity no later than 12-16 months from the start of construction and installation works. Such projects, first of all, include the construction of solar power plants, wind power plants, bioenergy facilities and the use of highly maneuverable gas generation (GTU/GPU).
Instead, the construction of four nuclear units announced by the Ministry of Energy will require more than 20 billion USD. In this context, two important questions arise. First, where will NNEGC Energoatom get such money, having debts of about UAH 17 billion for PSO alone? Second, does it make sense to spend many billions of UAH every month on a project that will allow electricity to be supplied no earlier than in five years?
I have no answer to the first question at all, since I cannot imagine who would provide NNEGC Energoatom with huge loans in wartime, and the increase in electricity prices is limited by the low solvency of consumers. The answer to the second question is also obvious, that priority in financing in conditions of limited financial assistance from partners and a critical situation at the front should be given to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. After all, if the enemy is not stopped, then another question arises - what is the point in building the specified nuclear units? Of course, Ukraine needs a new nuclear generation, but there are nuances.
As already stated by the Ministry of Energy, it is planned to build four nuclear units, which will house the following reactors – two of the Russian design VVER-1000 and two of the Westinghouse design – AP-1000. If there are fewer questions about the AP-1000 reactors, then the choice of the Russian design seems quite questionable, not so much from the point of view of compliance with modern safety and technology standards, but rather from the point of view of creating additional dependence on the Russian developer for operational requirements, maintenance, and components.
At the current moment, it seems more appropriate for the government to focus on the issues of developing feasibility studies for projects to build new nuclear units, selecting reactors, preparing a multitude of technical documentation, and legislative support, rather than spending huge amounts of money on construction and installation work.
Also, government officials should focus on the problem of achieving the independence of the regulator (DIYAR) from the operating organization and the relevant ministry and on improving its staffing. This work should be done so that immediately after the end of the war, under favorable for Ukraine , without wasting time, we can move on to the practical phase of project implementation.
