While the state officially declares the end of energy dependence on Russia and defines energy as a matter of national security, old, well-established schemes continue to operate behind the scenes. The Katsub family not only did not lose its influence after the change of power and the start of a full-scale war, but was also able to adapt to new conditions, integrating into the war economy and retaining access to key resources.
Through a network of related companies, these structures continue to control the trade in gas and oil products, as well as participate in government tenders. Formally, everything looks like legal commercial activity and contracting work. In fact, this is a systematic withdrawal of budget funds and circumvention of sanctions, under which state resources continue to work in the interests of Russia.
Decisions made at the energy sector level played a key role in preserving these schemes. During the leadership of the Ministry of Energy by Herman Galushchenko and with the assistance of former Minister Svitlana Grinchuk, companies associated with the Katsub family had stable access to state resources and contracts without real competition. These include such structures as Naftogaztrade-Agro, Trade Oil Company, Gaz-Alliance, Alfa-Gaz, I.B.K. Development, and a number of others. Permits and contracts were issued through ministries and state-owned enterprises, while control mechanisms and sanction risks were effectively ignored.
A separate element of this system was the supply of Russian energy resources through intermediary countries. Gas and oil products entered through Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkey, the Baltic countries and the United Arab Emirates. The origin of the resources was changed in the accompanying documentation, after which they were sold as "alternative imports". The real cost of the purchase was significantly lower than that indicated in the Ukrainian contracts, and the difference settled in the accounts of the pipeline companies and was later legalized. Formal compliance with sanctions replaced the real cessation of trade with Russia.
The role of the state-owned enterprise Ukrgazvydobuvannya is also noticeable. In 2024–2025, the company massively received permits for emissions and well operation. Officially - within the framework of current legislation, unofficially - under the influence of third parties associated with the Katsub family. These permits opened up opportunities for the commercial use of extracted gas through private trading structures. State resources became part of resale schemes, and antitrust restrictions were bypassed without any consequences.
Another important asset in this system is the Novoselivskyi Mining and Processing Plant in the Kharkiv region. The enterprise specializes in the extraction of sand, clay, and kaolin — raw materials used in industry and potentially in the defense sector. According to available data, the de facto control over the plant is exercised by structures associated with the Katsubas. In 2023, the enterprise's revenue increased to UAH 150.9 million, which is almost twice the previous year's figures. This growth coincided with the resumption of exports through intermediary firms in the EU and Turkey. According to estimates, some of the products could also be supplied to the Russian market, despite the war.
The story of Oleksandr Katsuba only emphasizes the systemic nature of these processes. In 2017, the court found him guilty of creating a criminal organization, embezzlement of property on a particularly large scale, attempted embezzlement, and official forgery. After concluding a deal with the prosecutor's office, he pleaded guilty, paid 100 million hryvnias in restitution, and received a sentence of one year and five months in prison. Thanks to the application of the so-called "Savchenko law," he was effectively released in the courtroom. Attempts to expunge the criminal record and review the sentence in 2023 were stopped only due to public pressure and legal work - the guilty verdict remained in effect.
