The situation on the front in the Kursk region remains tense, as Russian troops cannot achieve the desired progress in pushing Ukrainian forces out of this strategically important region. In the face of protracted fighting and resistance from Ukrainian troops, analysts are focused on assessing Russia's capabilities to further strengthen its positions. One military expert, Konstantin Mashovets, tried to calculate how many additional forces Russia can mobilize for the Kursk direction and what resources can be involved for this.
I was recently asked what forces and means the enemy command could use to "stabilize" the situation in this direction, and in the future - to try to push the Armed Forces of Ukraine beyond its own border in the Kursk region.
So, let's try to figure it out if possible.
1. First of all, we are talking about the troops (forces) of the “Leningrad Military District” (LVO), also known as the “North” Group of Forces (GF) (commander - Mr. Lapin).
For those who have forgotten, let me remind you:
- 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), consisting of the 138th and 25th separate motorized rifle brigades (OMBR);
- 14th Army Corps (AK), consisting of the 80th and 200th Separate Rifle Brigades;
- 44th AK, as part of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade;
- 11th AK, consisting of the 18th MRD and the 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (OMSR);
- 61st Separate Marine Brigade (MP) of the Northern Fleet;
- 336th regiment of MP "Baltic Fleet".
These are the enemy's formations and units of the "LVO", whose units and subdivisions MAY appear "near Kursk" first. Although in practice there are many problems of a "current" nature that prevent this or significantly limit the ability of the Russian command of the appropriate level to bring the above-mentioned forces and means there in "full format".
This may be the use of the main components of the specified forces and assets in other operational directions, or a significant “shoulder” of the maneuver, which will negatively affect the timing of concentration and deployment, or the inconsistency of the real state of their combat readiness with the complex and volume of tasks that the Russians will have to solve specifically in the Kursk operational direction, and without prior training or significant replenishment of military equipment and weapons, in the “on the go” mode.
For example, the battalions of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade are apparently currently involved in the fighting in the Kramatorsk direction, north of the town of Chasiv Yar, so it will be difficult to completely withdraw them from there. Or the 14th AK, whose brigades are involved in the Prydniprovsk direction, or the 336th MP formation, which is one of the “main” formations in the enemy’s 5th ZVA zone of action, are also “problematic” in this sense, and so on
That is, it is obvious that the Russian command is unlikely to be able to QUICKLY assemble some kind of integral and structured group of troops from the “regular” troops (forces) of the Northern Military District in the Kursk operational direction, which would be capable of “solving tasks significant in scope and depth” (for example, displacing the Armed Forces of Ukraine in general in the interfluve of the Seim and Psel rivers beyond the state border).
In other words, at this point it can operate in the Kursk operational direction as a kind of "honeycomb" and exclusively to solve a limited range of tasks. For example, to hold certain areas and borders, cover important communications and infrastructure facilities, and generally try to hinder the process of expanding and improving the Ukrainian bridgehead in the Kursk region.
2. However, it is clear that this will not last very long. Over time, the Russians will begin to pull more and more troops there. They are ALREADY trying to do this. In my opinion, in the future, in terms of the formation and deployment of an ADDITIONAL group of enemy troops in the Kursk operational direction, we should expect a certain “inter-operational” regrouping there of a certain set of Russian troops from the composition of the Western, Southern and Eastern Fronts.
This is probably the 1st Tank Army (TA), and most likely its 47th Tank Division (TD) from the Kupyansk direction, the 3rd Army Corps (AK) consisting of the 6th MSD and the 72nd Omsk Brigade from the Kramatorsk direction, or even units and subdivisions of the 35th ZVA from the Polohivsk direction.
This development of events is evidenced by the recording of the units of the 83rd separate airborne assault brigade (odshbr) and the 810th and 155th MP regiments, which, as they say, were “at hand at the moment” by the Russian command and arrived in the zone of the Northern Army Corps, clearly not to block the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk direction, but to increase efforts in the Vovchansk area. But, as far as I understand, the enemy will still have to use part of these forces in the Kursk direction, and not for the “Vovchansk assaults.”.
And again, in this sense, the Russian command will need to “wrack its brains” over what and how to replace, for example, the 47th TD, which is obviously currently playing one of the key roles in the “breakthrough to Oskol”, or somehow extract the “extra” battalions of the 35th ZVAd brigades from the important Pologov direction, etc.
Moreover, in my opinion, even if the Russian command does have some "additional" troops (forces), for example, as a result of forcing the next stage of mobilization deployment, it will most likely direct them not to the Kursk direction, but to the strip of its Central Military District, which is currently actively pushing "as far west as possible" in the Pokrovsky and Torets directions (with the latter, judging by everything, certain troubles have ALREADY arisen).
