Nothing has been resolved and nothing is over in the war in Ukraine

Where can we expect the fiercest battles and what military equipment will be crucial for each side?

We analyze the prospects for hostilities and describe the general development of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the coming months.

Aviation factor

Russian aviation has returned to the battlefield as a serious factor — it is no longer just about the actions of Su-24s or Su-34s over Kharkiv or the border region of Sumy region, but also about the dropping of cast-iron bombs by Su-25 "Hrachs" on Chasiv Yar — that is, directly on the front line.

Russian bombs often land in the wrong place, but most still reach their approximate target.

And now the Russians are limited not even by the number of sides, but by the number of adjusted bombs.

It will not be possible to quickly and reliably prevent the threat from Russian aviation even if the first F-16s appear in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Russian pilots have more flying experience over many years, more experienced ground services than the quickly retrained Ukrainian ones, and more runways in the European part of the Russian Federation.

And there are also DRLS (long-range radar surveillance) aircraft – although Ukraine has shot down two of them and probably damaged several more during overhauls on the ground. But these planes will take to the air when the struggle for the initiative in the skies begins.

Therefore, a quick counteraction to Russian aviation is hardly possible - squadrons of Western aircraft will arrive in Ukraine gradually, and pilots will be trained over 10-month cycles. And these aircraft will also be introduced into combat gradually.

But it will still be better to ambush bomb carriers from low altitudes, shoot down cruise missiles and kamikaze drones that have broken through Ukrainian air defenses, conduct reconnaissance missions, “distribute” electronic warfare, and carry anti-ship missiles on Western aircraft with integrated helmet-mounted sights and airborne radars.

The F-16 is in any case significantly newer than the MiG-29, which the Ukrainian Air Force currently uses.

Drones and strikes in the rear

Russian reconnaissance drones Supercam and Zala, which often operate in the operational rear of the Armed Forces near the third line of defense, also remain a threat from the air - they have new optics (possibly Iranian) and are connected to an optical channel so as not to come under electronic warfare pressure.

It is behind their “eyes” that ballistic missiles arrive – Iskanders or their North Korean counterparts, often cluster ones.

This has happened before – for example, the strike in Pokrovsk on a train during loading or long-range strikes by Lancets on planes at airfields.

But recently, the number of strikes on the Ukrainian rear has noticeably increased.

It “flies” over overpasses, railway bridges, and anything that resembles the location of Ukrainian troops.

Periodically, the Russians re-strike the same places so that the State Emergency Service rescuers suffer losses.

Ukraine's post-Soviet anti-aircraft arsenal of the Osa, Strela, and Tunguska air defense systems with photocell-guided missiles or near-target detonation of non-contact fuses has proven itself well in this war against various drones. But these thousands of missiles that Ukraine inherited from the USSR are running out.

Similarly, the supply of Stingers is running out after attacks by hundreds of cruise missiles, Shaheds, Eagles, and other reconnaissance drones. What Ukraine has still received can be roughly estimated at 5-7 years of production of these MANPADS as of 2022.

At the same time, even the US is now using “reverse engineering” and refurbishing decommissioned MANPADS to replenish stockpiles until new production reaches planned levels.

And while there is a shortage of air defense means, more and more Russian drones are penetrating the tactical and operational rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and can guide high-precision weapons and ballistics.

Western assistance

Western aid to Ukraine continues, despite political difficulties.

It is important to understand that the US is not taking Kyiv off the balance sheet, despite the fierceness of its own internal political struggle. Therefore, sooner or later, the issue of American aid must be resolved - at least in the form of a loan with the possibility of write-off or another mechanism.

In parallel, contracts for ammunition are being concluded in the West, the production of “smart mines” is being resumed in Germany, and the 35x228 mm shell plant for the “Cheetahs” will reach planned capacity in mid-2024.

Work is also underway to localize the production of “Bayraktars” in Ukraine.

These drones have successfully proven themselves during a full-scale invasion, and they continue to be used for various tasks.

Although under current conditions they are still more effective as reconnaissance-correctors or even as carriers of radars with AFAR, that is, as radar stations with an “active phased array antenna” – a device that can simultaneously monitor airspace, make cartography and place electronic jamming on the enemy. This is exactly the kind of modernization that the Poles are currently doing with Italian equipment.

There remains the “drone coalition,” in which France, Germany, Britain, and other heavyweight countries send hundreds of kamikaze drones and reconnaissance aircraft to Ukraine.

Europe is expanding the production of launchers for PATRIOT - Ukrainian batteries and the "European Sky Shield" (a project to strengthen the air defense of European NATO countries - Ed. ) will require capacities and specialists.

In addition, Poland, Germany, Romania, Spain and the Netherlands are planning to buy up to 1,000 PAC-2 GEM-T missiles with the ability to “work” on ballistic targets with a non-contact fuse.

As for shells, there are prospects of receiving 1.5 million 155-mm ammunition from EU countries, including through the "Czech initiative.".

At the same time, it is recalled here that in the 1990s, US arsenals aimed at war with the Soviet Union amounted to 10 million 155-mm shells - so these stocks can probably still be found.

Today, four countries in Europe produce 155mm shells: Britain (BAE Systems), Germany (Rheinmetall), France (Nexter), and Finland together with Norway (Nammo).

The Finns, for example, have orders scheduled six years in advance – you buy today, and the queue is calculated until 2030.

All shell manufacturers are seeing significant growth in volumes and investments.

And this is an indicator that European industry is actually working and preparing to work in support of Ukraine.

The latest aid packages from Germany are the best barometer of what is happening with Ukraine's partners - 130 Marder infantry fighting vehicles upgraded to the "1A3" version and several hundred drones went to reinforce the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Russia's military industry

But at the same time, the Russians continue to mobilize their rear - their news is filled with endless reports that former factories of Western companies in the Russian Federation have begun producing gunpowder, and bread factories - drones.

Of course, in such production there will be defects, missed deadlines, and other nuances.

However, equipment and weapons are still actively entering the Russian army.

The launch of up to 500 Shahed missiles per month and 180 guided bomb strikes per day are also indicators of trends in the war.

Videos of the equipment of killed Russian soldiers are appearing on social media – they have digital walkie-talkies, already quite good first aid kits, night sights, ceramic plates for bulletproof vests, and knee pads. And these are infantry, not special forces.

There is a noticeable difference from the mobilized sample of 2022 with Esmarch's tourniquets.

The Russians are adapting to war and equipping their army.

In such conditions, Ukraine needs to “run as hard as it can to stay in place.”.

The ability to mobilize the rear and wage all-out war, rather than relying solely on EU and US resources, could mean a lot for Ukraine's future.

After all, we are talking about fundamental things for Ukraine – not even about whose Ughledar or Tokmak will be. But about survival.

If Russia can advance deep into Ukraine, it will do so.

If the Russians can turn Kherson or Kharkiv into ruins with UMPK bombs and rocket artillery, they will do it.

Missile strikes

The Russians' apparent plans for this summer campaign will be mass launches of strike drones and salvos of ballistic missiles, focusing on one target at a time.

As was the case with the Zmiivska or Trypilska TPPs, it is trivial to exhaust air defense in one sector and hit a specific target with missiles, putting it out of action for many months.

Here, the Russians' goal is to strike at the energy sector with an impact on Ukraine's economy and military-industrial complex at a time when it is beginning to intensify the production of its own weapons.

Moscow wants to influence this by destroying the energy sector, as its winter campaign of shelling scattered factories was less effective - Ukraine continues to produce long-range drones, naval surface drones, and self-propelled guns.

Directions of attack

Chasiv Yar and its heights are the gateway to Kostyantynivka and further to the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

The enemy there has the opportunity to hide in the ruins of Bakhmut and accumulate forces, as well as operate from outside the city with bombs.

He will try to knock out the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Klishchiivka and force the Seversky Donets-Donbas canal.

The Russians did not abandon their plan to get out of the dense construction here and further break out into the operational space.

And the offensive on Kupyansk is a struggle for logistics.

If the Ukrainian Armed Forces fight back there, it will already be a threat to the Russian lines – it will be difficult to dig three lines of concrete fortifications in the surrounding forests.

Finally, the Kreminna-Svatove front section is an important artery, the “foreground” of the railway branch to Starobilsk.

The Russians want to advance here so that the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not hit the railway with "Haimars" and drones.

The Russians are spending huge resources on attacks on villages and landings in this area and towards Kupyansk. They are trying to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces' precision weapons away from the occupied railway.

In addition, the Russian army has tried to advance near Vugledar several times since last year, regularly leaving dozens of pieces of equipment there, including both T-72B3 tanks of 2022 release and old T-55s.

That is, there will be a positional war in strategically important sectors - not only engineering fortifications will play a major role, but also the presence of military "gross product": mines, heavy infantry weapons, and ammunition wagons.

How to prepare for the rear

That is why the mobilization of the Ukrainian rear will be important.

Perhaps it would make sense to ask the allies for machine tools and reform the vocational school (for example, students would study there on the first shift, and production for the military-industrial complex would take place on the other two shifts).

Another option is to decentralize and move production to the suburbs. Organize the production of only hulls and castings at one enterprise, and fuses at another, and assemble all of this at dozens of small sites.

Another theoretical option is to relocate production and create jobs for Ukrainian refugees in Eastern Europe.

In general, military production in wartime is quite real - during World War II, the Germans expanded their military-industrial complex under the strategic bombing of the Allies and could produce hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs per year.

And it wasn't about 20 rocket strikes a week - this was achieved during months of bombing of factories with dozens of direct hits on the workshops.

And Ukraine now needs literally everything – “screwdriver” truck assembly, various ammunition, mines for mortars and guided mines, various palliative air defense launchers for “air-to-air” missiles adapted for launches from the ground, hundreds of long-range drones and dozens of missiles (for example, “Neptunes” for firing not only at sea, but also at land).

From the frontline videos, it is noticeable that during attacks by Russian tanks, they are covered either by artillery fire or by FPV drones, and there are not so many launches of ATGMs and anti-tank missile systems.

Although all the conditions for them are there in the steppes, there are not many reserves, despite the large arsenals of the US and EU countries.

But the phase of the “war of attrition” is such that anything can end.

Therefore, Ukraine should not depend on the domestic politics of other countries, but should do everything to produce as much as possible at home, to produce realistically.

And what Ukraine will not be able to do is buy on credit, re-export, and buy weapons from the Persian Gulf countries with a surcharge for urgency.

Russia really lost the “quick” war against Ukraine that it planned in 2022. But the Kremlin seeks to either freeze the situation, work on its mistakes, and try again.

Or, simply put, crush the Armed Forces of Ukraine with their own resources on the battlefield – human waves and arrays of equipment.

In parallel, they are accumulating missiles for strikes on the rear and housing and communal services.

And they are equipping new units – tank and artillery brigades and regiments (albeit based on outdated D-1 howitzers and T-55 tanks, but these are still weapons).

Moscow is set for a protracted campaign – the Russians may only have enough equipment until the end of the year (given the number of golf carts and other unexpected vehicles they are currently using due to the lack of regular armored vehicles).

But the Kremlin seems to have staked everything on this war. And the Russians are ready to spend all their resources for years to come to occupy as much of Ukrainian territory as possible.

Therefore, nothing has been decided and nothing has been finished in the war yet.

Ukrainians are facing a difficult summer.