The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISW) has made a forecast regarding a possible new offensive by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) on the territory of Ukraine. According to analysts, such an attack can be directed in only one direction.
The ability of Russia to advance along the Ukrainian border may limit the use of personnel and equipment of the Armed Forces. At the same time, Western aid and mobilization in Ukraine would help mitigate the consequences of the Russian offensive. The "Institute for the Study of War" writes about this in a summary dated March 28.
In an interview with Western media, President Volodymyr Zelenskyi said that they are building fortifications and defensive positions near the city of Sumy in response to reports of a significant build-up of Russian forces in the neighboring Bryansk region and strikes on Ukrainian settlements in the area.
The local authorities of the Sumy region recently warned that the Russian Federation is conducting an information operation with the threat of a possible attack on the region, but noted that the Ukrainian authorities have not noticed any Russian strike groups near the borders.
ISW analysts have also found no visual evidence of Russian forces massing in the Bryansk region in preparation for any significant military action.
In the coming months, the Russian Armed Forces will most likely be able to conduct a large-scale offensive operation in only one direction, and it is unlikely that the Russian troops will give priority to some new front instead of the operational directions they have been focusing on for the past year and a half.
Theoretically, the Russian Armed Forces can concentrate forces at any point along the front line with a length of more than 3,000 km along the border territory of the Russian Federation, Belarus — in addition to the front line in Ukraine. This would force Ukraine to take retaliatory actions. Withdraw resources from other, more active areas of the front.
Judging by everything, analysts write, Ukraine already has to choose priority areas of the front, where limited human and material resources are deployed. And even a limited transfer of Ukrainian equipment and personnel from active front-line zones may turn out to be destabilizing.
Russia's summer offensive: ISW forecast
Future Russian offensive operations will not necessarily be limited to the existing front lines in eastern and southern Ukraine. It is enough for the Russian military command to direct only a portion of the troops to any previously inactive area to force Ukraine to withdraw personnel and equipment from other areas, potentially creating vulnerabilities that the Russian Armed Forces can exploit.
Timely military assistance from the US and resolution of current personnel problems would eliminate these vulnerabilities. Ukrainian officials recently said that the Ukrainian military is prioritizing the rotation and rest of forward units, as well as other efforts to optimize the military structure.
The need for rotation is only part of the personnel problem facing Ukraine. ISW continues to believe that the delivery of key Western systems—many of which only the US can provide quickly and in significant quantities—will play a critical role in determining the prospects for the Russian Armed Forces in 2024 and when the Armed Forces can try to regain the initiative.
The course of the war until the end of 2024 largely depends on the provision of US military aid and the continuation of military support from non-American organizations, as well as on whether Ukraine manages to solve personnel problems.
Further forecasts of the war in Ukraine vary from the best to the most dangerous. Uncertainty will persist until it is clear whether the US will resume military support and whether Ukraine will resolve its current personnel issues. The USA and Ukraine have opportunities to influence and determine how the war will develop in 2024 and in the following years. The immediate and long-term prospects, as before, depend on the decisions that have yet to be made in Washington, Kyiv, Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Moscow and other cities, as well as on the implementation of those decisions on the battlefield.
