The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISW) has made a forecast regarding a possible new offensive by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RFAF) on the territory of Ukraine. According to analysts, such an offensive can be directed in only one direction.
Russia's ability to advance along the Ukrainian border could limit the use of Ukrainian military personnel and equipment. At the same time, Western aid and mobilization in Ukraine would help mitigate the consequences of a Russian offensive, the Institute for the Study of War wrote in a March 28 briefing.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in an interview with Western media that fortifications and defensive positions are being built near the city of Sumy in response to reports of a significant buildup of Russian forces in the neighboring Bryansk region and attacks on Ukrainian settlements in the area.
Local authorities in Sumy Oblast recently warned that Russia was conducting an information operation threatening a possible attack on the region, but noted that Ukrainian authorities had not spotted any Russian strike groups near the borders.
ISW analysts also found no visual evidence that Russian troops are concentrating in the Bryansk region in preparation for any significant military action.
In the coming months, the Russian Armed Forces will most likely be able to conduct a large-scale offensive operation in only one direction, and it is unlikely that the Russian troops will prioritize any new front instead of the operational directions they have been focusing on for the past year and a half.
Theoretically, the Russian Armed Forces could concentrate forces at any point along the front line, which is more than 3,000 km long along the border territory of the Russian Federation and Belarus, in addition to the front line in Ukraine. This would force Ukraine to take retaliatory action. To divert resources from other, more active sections of the front.
Apparently, analysts write, Ukraine is already having to choose priority areas of the front, where limited human and material resources are deployed. And even a limited transfer of Ukrainian equipment and personnel from active front-line zones could prove destabilizing.
Russia's Summer Offensive: ISW Forecast
Future Russian offensive operations will not necessarily be limited to the existing front lines in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian military command need only send a small portion of its forces to any previously inactive area to force Ukraine to withdraw personnel and equipment from other areas, potentially creating vulnerabilities that the Russian military could exploit.
Timely military assistance from the United States and resolution of current personnel issues would address these vulnerabilities. Ukrainian officials recently reported that the Ukrainian military is prioritizing rotation and rest of forward units, as well as other efforts to optimize the military structure.
The need for rotation is only part of the personnel problem facing Ukraine. ISW continues to believe that the supply of key Western systems—many of which only the United States can provide quickly and in significant quantities—will play a crucial role in determining the prospects for the Russian Armed Forces in 2024 and when the Ukrainian Armed Forces can attempt to regain the initiative.
The course of the war until the end of 2024 largely depends on the provision of US military assistance and continued military support from non-US organizations, as well as on whether Ukraine can resolve its personnel problems.
The future of the war in Ukraine varies from the best to the most dangerous. Uncertainty will persist until it becomes clear whether the United States will resume military support and whether Ukraine will resolve its current personnel problems. The United States and Ukraine have the opportunity to influence and determine how the war will develop in 2024 and beyond. The near-term and long-term prospects, as before, depend on the decisions that remain to be made in Washington, Kyiv, Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, and elsewhere, as well as on the implementation of these decisions on the battlefield.
