The Russian armed forces are likely to reach their peak at the end of 2024, and during 2025 the problems with their material and technical support will begin to intensify, write in an analytical article, researchers of the Royal Joint Defense Research Institute (RUSI) Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds.
They note that Russia expects to win Ukraine by 2026, but everything will depend on the level of international support for Kyiv and the state of the Russian army.
"Russia, as before, has a strategic goal of subordinating Ukraine to itself. Now she thinks she is winning. The surrender terms currently being proposed by Russian mediators include Ukraine giving up territory already under Russian control, as well as Kharkiv and, in some options, Odesa; consent not to join NATO and a head of state approved by Russia. The only significant concession offered by Russia is that what remains of Ukraine can join the EU," the authors write.
In their opinion, the process by which Russia intends to achieve such a result consists of three stages - continued pressure along the entire front line, attempts to break the determination of Ukraine's international partners to continue providing military aid, and further offensive operations that will bring success on the field battle
"Then they plan to use these successes as a lever of pressure on Kyiv to force it to capitulate on Russian terms. The planning horizon for the realization of these goals, which is the basis for the formation of Russian forces and industrial production, predicts that victory should be achieved by 2026," experts note.
The Russian theory of victory is plausible if Ukraine's international partners cannot adequately provide the Armed Forces with resources, the authors of the article write.
However, if Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support, Russia is unlikely to make significant progress in 2025.
The Russian army started 2023 with a very disorganized army in Ukraine, numbering approximately 360,000 troops. However, as of the beginning of 2024, the grouping of Russian troops in the occupied territories numbered 470,000 servicemen.
At the same time, experts note that the Russians lack trained officers capable of coordinating large formations.
The Russian troop grouping continues to suffer significant losses, but is nevertheless increasing. Although no large-scale offensive is currently underway, Russian units are tasked with conducting smaller tactical attacks that, at a minimum, inflict sustained casualties on Ukraine and allow Russian forces to seize and hold positions.
As for combat equipment, the Russian army group has approximately 4,780 units of barrel artillery, of which 20% are self-propelled; 1130 RSZV; 2060 tanks; and 7,080 other armored combat vehicles, mainly MT-LB, BMP and APC.
They continue to be supported by 290 helicopters, including 110 attack helicopters and 310 high-speed jets.
At the same time, the authors of the report note a shortage of ammunition in the Russian army, which limits its ability to use this technique, as well as a lack of pilots with sufficient experience to perform key missions.
In general, experts believe that while the quality of Russian forces is unlikely to improve as long as the Armed Forces continue to destroy enemy forces, the Russians will be able to maintain a steady pace of attacks throughout 2024.
The authors of the article also consider the capabilities of Russian industry to support ongoing military operations and note that Russia has significantly mobilized its defense industry by increasing work shifts and expanding production lines at existing facilities.
It also re-commissioned factories that had previously been mothballed. This led to a significant increase in production volumes, in particular tanks and Iskander ballistic missiles.
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However, despite these achievements, Russia faces significant limitations in the durability and reliability of its industrial production. Among the tanks and other armored fighting vehicles supplied to the army, approximately 80% are not new, but instead refurbished and upgraded from Russian military stockpiles.
Experts note that although Russia can maintain a stable production volume until 2024, as early as 2025 it will face the fact that military equipment will need a much more serious restoration, and by 2026 it will exhaust most of its existing reserves.
As the amount of refurbished equipment decreases, industrial capacity can focus on creating new platforms, but this will necessarily mean a significant decrease in the amount of equipment supplied to the military.
Another vulnerability of Russia in the production of weapons, in particular missiles, is its high dependence on Western components. While Russia has been able to secure supplies of essential components through the West's inconsistent approach to sanctions, a more coordinated approach to countering Russia's defense industry could disrupt its supply lines.
Even with the existing problems with the introduction of sanctions, the cost of components for the Russian defense sector has increased by 30%, and the Russian Federation has only managed to stabilize supplies, not expand them, despite additional investments in this industry.
But the authors of the article consider the production of ammunition to be the most serious problem for Russia. Russian industry cannot provide the needs that, according to the country's Ministry of Defense, are necessary to achieve significant territorial gains in 2025. In addition, the Ministry of Defense of Russia does not believe that it will be able to significantly increase production in the coming years, if they do not create new plants and do not invest in the extraction of raw materials with a performance period of more than five years.
This means that in order to adequately resource the armed forces, Russia must - in the short term - further deplete its ammunition reserves, most of which are in poor condition.
To further compensate for the shortage, Russia has signed supply and production contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea and Syria. While the supply of projectiles from North Korea will help Russia in 2024, it will not compensate for the significant shortage of 152 mm ammunition in 2025.
Experts conclude that if Ukraine's partners continue to provide the Armed Forces with sufficient ammunition and training support, Russia is unlikely to make significant progress in 2025.
At the same time, after 2026, the combat power of Russia will begin to decrease significantly, and Russian industry may be severely undermined by this time, which will worsen the situation for the country in the long term.
