Economist Volodymyr Omelchenko asks how to further develop Ukrainian energy during the war. Undoubtedly, Ukraine needs a new nuclear generation, but there are nuances.
SHOULD UKRAINE BUILD NEW NPP UNITS?
I have always supported the idea that Ukraine will not be able to achieve the goals of the energy transition and ensure sufficient capacities for economic development without the growth of RES generation, the construction of new nuclear units and the creation of modern maneuverable generation and energy storage systems.
about 16 GW of capacity during the Russian aggression It should also be taken into account that most of the thermal generation facilities have long since expired. According to the apt expression of ex-Minister of Energy Ivan Plachkov, our energy industry resembles a museum of technology of the 1960s and 1980s, which is similar to the automobile fleet of Cuba, characterized by the achievements of the American automobile industry of the pre-revolutionary period.
Today, the UES has no capacity reserves, and those old TPPs inherited from the USSR are in a state of disrepair due to wear and tear of assets and destruction by Russian missiles and drones. Therefore, the existing energy capacities are not only not able to provide electricity for the future recovery of the economy, but also an acceptable level of reliability of energy supply during the war period, when a huge number of enterprises lie in ruins.
As you know, the current OZP Ukraine is at a satisfactory level largely thanks to the warm winter and the import of electricity. In such a situation, it seems that the rational solution is to use funds for the repair of the existing infrastructure and the implementation of decentralized projects that can start producing electricity no later than 12-16 months after the start of construction and installation works. Such projects should primarily include the construction of SPPs, WPPs, bioenergy facilities and the use of highly maneuverable gas generation (GTU/HPU).
Instead, the Ministry of Energy stated that the construction of four nuclear units will require more than 20 billion dollars. USA. In this context, two important questions arise. First, where will NAEK Energoatom get such money, which has a debt of about UAH 17 billion only for PSO? Second, does it make sense to spend many billions of hryvnias every month on a project that will allow the supply of electric energy no earlier than in five years?
I don't have an answer to the first question at all, because I can't imagine who would provide huge loans to Energoatom National Electric Power Plant in wartime conditions, and the increase in electricity prices is limited by the low solvency of consumers. The answer to the second question is also obvious, that the priority in financing in the conditions of limited financial assistance from partners and the critical situation at the front should be given to the needs of the Armed Forces. After all, if the enemy is not stopped, then another question arises - what is the point in the construction of these nuclear blocks? Undoubtedly, Ukraine needs a new nuclear generation, but there are nuances.
As already announced by the Ministry of Energy, it is planned to build four nuclear units on which the following reactors will be placed - two of Russian design VVER-1000 and two designed by Westinghouse - AP-1000. If there are fewer questions about the AP-1000 type reactors, then the choice of the Russian project seems quite questionable, not so much from the point of view of compliance with modern safety and technology standards, but from the point of view of creating additional dependence on the Russian developer in terms of operational requirements, maintenance and components.
At the current moment, it seems that it is more expedient for the government to focus on the development of feasibility studies for the construction of new nuclear units, the selection of reactors, the preparation of a lot of technical documentation and legislative support, than on spending huge amounts of money on construction and installation works.
Also, government officials should focus on the problem of achieving independence of the regulator (DIYAR) from the operating organization and relevant ministry and on improving its staffing. It is expedient to do this work so that immediately after the end of the war, on favorable for Ukraine , without wasting time, we can proceed to the practical phase of project implementation.
