The enemy is drawing more and more new forces under Bakhmut. This probably means that the Russians are going to set up a new Avdiivka here, military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets suggests.
In the direction of Bakhmut, the enemy continues to try to break through to the "Siverskyi Donets - Donbas" channel... The main directions of his efforts here are:
- directorate Bohdanivka — Chasiv Yar, here the enemy attacks in two main sections — through the actual village. Bohdanivka (the north-eastern part of which, he apparently already took control), and along road 00506;
- Ivanovske — Stupochki, acting north and northeast of the village. Ivanovske;
- well, he is trying to go around the ruins of the village again. Klishchiivka is north and northwest of them, because of the heights.
In addition, the enemy occasionally attacks east of Klishchiivka and in the vicinity of the village of Andriivka (or, better to say, what was left of him). That is, he is trying to advance BEYOND the section of the railway between Bakhmut and Horlivka, in a general westerly direction.
As we remember, the enemy's offensive in the area of Bakhmut began immediately after he managed to stop the advance of our troops south of the city. When our advanced units took control of Klishchiivka and Andriivka, as well as came close to Zelenopilla and Kurdyumovka, a real opportunity arose to cut the enemy's rock communications south of the city.
At this very moment, having regrouped his forces and means in the city of Bakhmut and north of it and concentrated here the main forces of his 2nd and 3rd army corps (AK), as well as no less than 2 divisions of airborne troops ( 98th and 106th Airborne Divisions) and determined forces of the 8th Combined Arms Army (ZVA), in particular its 150th Motorized Rifle Division — the enemy himself went on the offensive from the line Dubovo-Vasylivka — Berkhivka, in the area of Yagidne and Chrome, in the general south-western direction (that is, accentuated in the direction of Chasiv Yar).
Moreover, the enemy gradually increased the forces introduced into the battle. For example, at first the 98th paratroopers operated as one regiment (331st paratroopers\pdp), but then brought two others into battle - the 217th and 299th pdp, gradually moved here from the Lymansky direction.
The same happened with the forces of the 2nd and 3rd AK, which were engaged by the enemy in the Bakhmut direction — with the 83rd and 88th separate motorized rifle brigades (omsbr) of the 2nd AK and 3rd AK (initially there was one his 72nd omsbr, and then the introduction into battle of the regiments of the entire 6th MSD began).
That is, in fact, what was happening was included in the "scheme", which was obviously developed by the Ukrainian command during the planning and organization of the summer-autumn campaign of 2023.
Namely, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy will in one way or another be forced to make maximum efforts to hold the city of Bakhmut (and even out of social and political expediency), to withdraw part of the enemy's forces in the direction of Bakhmut and, in particular, to carry out a series of active, offensive actions in other directions, for example — in the Southern operational zone.
However, judging by everything, the enemy command calculated this and did what was expected of it - it concentrated here a group of its airborne troops (pdv) and a significant part of the 3rd AK, which, with other "schedules", could be - or in the Lyman direction, or somewhere in the south (for example, in the Berdyan or Melitopol directions).
However, the Russians did it with a completely conscious "time delay", i.e., waiting for the right moment.
Whose?
And the exhaustion of the offensive capabilities of our troops in the Bakhmut region is quite understandable...
What's more, now, in fact, the Russians are using (more precisely, they used) this offensive as an "auxiliary" to withdraw part of our forces from the Donetsk direction.
At the moment, the situation in this direction looks as follows:
- in the area of the village In Ivanovo, the enemy is advancing with the forces of the 102nd motorized rifle regiment (msp) of the 150th motorized rifle division (msd), relatively recently introduced into battle;
- to the north, in the direction of Bohdanivske — Chasiv Yar and north of Ivanivskyi, units of the 331st and 217th PDP operate (that is, units and units of the 98th PDP continue to perform the role of the "main assault force" in the enemy's offensive actions in the direction of "Chasik" );
- in the area northwest and east of Klishchiivka and further south to Andriivka, the motorized rifle regiments of the territorial troops (msp TrV) of the 6th motorized rifle division (msd) of the 3rd AK operate, in particular, the 1008th and 1194th msp TrV, as well as a whole "set" of units of the 83rd and 88th separate motorized rifle brigades (omsbr) of the 2nd AK of the 8th combined arms army (ZVA).
But for a general understanding of the situation, it is worth remembering that the use of the term "Bakhmut direction" is usually a bit broader than the actual situation near and around this city. This is the situation both north of the city (in fact, the southern face of the Siversky ledge) and south of it.
That is, when we say "Bakhmut direction", we must understand that we are talking about a "slightly larger" section of the LBZ than, in fact, the battles around the city.
For example, the active (offensive) actions of the enemy's 106th PDD together with units of the 123rd OMSR in the directions of Rozdolivka and Vyimka, north and northeast of the city of Soledar, also refer to this direction and directly affect the situation around Bakhmut.
Let's summarize...
In my opinion, the Bakhmut direction has every prospect of being considered by the enemy's command as the "next replacement" for Avdiivskyi in the near future based on several signs. But about them - some other time...