It is 10 years since the annexation of Crimea. Analyst Oleksiy Kopytko returns to these events to talk about what strategy is needed for the peninsula and why real peace is impossible without its return to Ukraine.
10 years of war (formally)
Together with Dima Tymchuk, we have been studying the role of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the system of Russian influence in Crimea since 2008. Therefore, we have observations over a period of 15+ years. And deeply subjective tendentious conclusions that will certainly offend the feelings of believers.
1. It seems to me that at the beginning of the war, the Kremlin did not have a clear plan to "seize and annex Crimea." Such a result was not determined in advance, it developed as events unfolded.
They certainly had some training (they also theoretically worked in our GS in defense). Some power component and networks on the ground were ready. It was known that almost all of Ukraine's power leadership (in the National Security and Defense Council, the Minister of Defense, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.) are citizens and/or agents of Russia. And a tactic (which is still used today) was honed over decades: to press until it is pressed. Against this background, the political decision to "press" was made.
If Yanukovych had somehow remained at the head of the state, I think, at that moment, they would not have rushed to formalize the illegal annexation, they would have fought for more. A weakening regime would be used for hybrid force penetration and expansion of all forms of presence at least in the south and east. Which would soon lead to a military conflict, probably even more tragic for Ukraine .
2. When the command to "press" began to materialize, quite expectedly, the Ukrainian power verticals were paralyzed . The military and special services did not receive adequate commands, many officials took advantage of the loophole to evade decision-making in conditions of uncertainty, so as not to be held accountable for anything later.
I remember that time very well. A feeling of complete helplessness. When there was information, but there was simply no one to pass it on to for action.
3. The pushback could come 1) as a reaction from the West and 2) as a reaction from citizens.
The event was as shameful as possible, limited to Obama's decorative decree on the introduction of sanctions two weeks after the beginning of the occupation. A vivid illustration of the principle "too little is too late."
The resistance of the population turned on with a delay. For obvious reasons.
On the one hand, people were confused and scared. It was hard to believe what was happening. It was difficult for many to form their attitude. Especially, taking into account the dominance of Russia in the information space.
On the other hand, there were mistakes in the fever of the first days. I am convinced that the cancellation of the "Kivalova-Kolesnichenko" language law is a tragic mistake. This is the most untimely decision, which seriously facilitated the enemy's task.
I think that if Moscow faced opposition at the international level, then in that situation in Sevastopol it would retain control, but it would be possible to fight for Crimea.
(I deliberately do not write anything about the resistance directly in the Crimea itself at the end of February - in the spring of 2014. The participants of the events will write about it in due time. Because the current picture is distorted).
As a result, Putin was able to bring the game to a hard-to-reverse result: he formally included the occupied Crimea and Sevastopol in the Russian Federation.
4. If you look through the prism of those events, the connections with the present are very prominent .
Today, when I read comments about yet another "historic" speech by some Western politician who saw and/or "opened the eyes" of the world, I mentally play bingo. Fixing what many in Ukraine have been shouting about since 2014.
The thesis, which the West still does not dare to fully voice and around which they verbally dance: a reactive position is evil, it is a dead end and a clear loss. Since the end of 2020, this thesis has been voiced by the Ukrainian side at all thematic meetings that I can judge.
The aggressor always wins, "deterrence" after the fact does not work. The only chance to prevent negative scenarios is proactive, preventive actions. And this will not be a "provocation". Just the opposite is the best antidote.
But accepting it is scary because it changes all strategies.
The second point: the desire of Western partners to act not as they should, but as they feel comfortable. And demand from the victim of aggression not to violate this comfort. What in 2014, what in 2022.
Therefore, an applied conclusion: when it comes to Russians, you need to put up as much frantic resistance as possible. For any intention.
It doesn't matter if it looks like a disproportionate use of force. If you give in to the persuasion "not to escalate" - everything will definitely end badly. And so there will be a chance.
The third moment. Since 2014, partners have been repeatedly informed that the occupation of Crimea has completely changed the context.
The seizure and illegal annexation of Crimea is an attack not only on Ukraine. Among other things, it is the undermining of two fundamental ideas of the world order:
- ideas of respect for the territorial integrity of states;
- ideas of free shipping.
If a country that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council attacks the foundation on which the world rests, the consequences will definitely affect everyone. Not only Europeans.
If the Kremlin can occupy the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, why can't the Houthis riot? Whoever has the power or the situational opportunity to impose his demands will be able to play without rules.
Accordingly, this situation can be rolled back only by returning Crimea. And this is the common interest of all those for whom these ideas are important.
Of course, there are those who would like to revise them for their own reasons, because there are hundreds of conflicts and fault points on the planet. Therefore, it is worth considering the consequences.
5. As for Crimea itself. A lot has changed in 10 years.
When the time comes, it will be the return of another Crimea to another Ukraine . Therefore, it is necessary to develop models, but any attempts now to pedal some obsessive ideas about the post-war system of life on the peninsula are a waste of time and a way to digest.
Now the main thing is that the idea of Crimea as a naval fortress has been seriously undermined. Continuation of this opinion is the demilitarized zone. And some format of international guarantees, so that it would be profitable to invest money there.
There are many predictions about Crimea, but the fact is that Crimea is no longer beyond the pale.
