The situation is not conducive to bold offensive operations by the Ukrainian army, military commentator Mykola Beleskov admits in a column for The Atlantic Council. Therefore, the only reasonable plan for 2024 is defensive.
A full-scale Russian invasion is approaching a two-year deadline, and it is vital for Ukraine's military and political leadership to learn the lessons of 2022 and 2023.
The most important conclusion to be drawn from the last two years of fighting is the dominance of defensive warfare over offensive operations. This has been demonstrated many times, starting with the failure of Russia's blitzkrieg in the first month of the war.
A second key lesson is the importance of balancing political objectives with military capabilities. Political considerations forced both Russia and Ukraine to launch an offensive with insufficient forces, which led to heavy losses.
Although Ukraine's long-term goal remains the complete liberation of the country from Russian occupation, current circumstances do not favor bold offensive operations. On the international front, US and EU aid commitments have faced serious political hurdles, while efforts to expand military equipment and weapons production have fallen far behind schedule. In Ukraine, there is growing concern over the high number of casualties and potential labor shortages.
With this in mind, Ukraine's military strategy for 2024 should focus on maintaining the front line and ensuring permanent control over approximately 82% of the country's territory, which remains in Ukrainian hands. A strategic transition to active defense would match Ukraine's current strength, allowing valuable time to regroup and rearm ahead of the likely more favorable conditions in 2025.
What is important is that a more defensive position will allow Ukraine to take advantage of Moscow's urgent need for victories. With the Russian military under enormous political pressure in anticipation of an advance, Ukrainian commanders will have plenty of opportunity to steadily bleed Putin's invasion force, just as they are currently doing at Avdiivka.
At the same time, Ukraine should seek to continue reducing Russia's ability to wage war by conducting an escalating campaign of airstrikes against targets far behind the front lines throughout the territory of occupied Ukraine and Russia itself. This may include attacks on troop concentrations, military bases and ammunition depots, as well as logistics centers and weapons production facilities.
By adopting an active defense strategy in 2024, Kyiv can achieve the dual goal of preventing any significant Russian advance and creating conditions conducive to Ukraine's success in a war of attrition. This would set the stage for a return to offensive operations in 2025.
The effectiveness of any defense strategy in 2024 will largely depend on the level of support from Ukraine's partners. As for arms supplies, the priorities will take into account the huge amount of artillery ammunition, along with electronic warfare systems, attack drones, additional air defense assets and long-range missiles. The hotly anticipated arrival of F-16 fighter jets in the coming months will also greatly enhance Ukraine's ability to deny Russia control of the skies.
If this military assistance is provided, Ukraine will be able to implement a strategy of active defense during the next year, as well as prepare for future offensives. This training should include expanded training programs for the Ukrainian military in NATO countries. While tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers had already been trained in the first two years of the war, failures on the front lines in the second half of 2023 showed the shortcomings of these efforts. Clearly, much more time is needed to equip Ukrainian soldiers with the military knowledge and skills necessary to succeed on the battlefield.
The transition to active defense in 2024 will not prevent Ukraine from carrying out specific offensive actions. The most likely focus of Ukraine's offensive operations during the next year will be the Crimean peninsula occupied by Russia. This was confirmed by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, in a recent interview with The Economist.
The systematic destruction of Russian logistical and military potential in Crimea during 2024 pursues two important goals. First, it will help ensure freedom of merchant shipping in the Black Sea, building on Ukraine's recent progress in breaking through Russia's naval blockade of ports. Second, it would hamper the Kremlin's efforts to resupply the Russian military in southern Ukraine, potentially creating weak points along the front lines of the ground war.
Ukraine's success in the Battle of the Black Sea demonstrated the power of Western weapons combined with the skill and ingenuity of the Ukrainian military. Further breakthroughs in Crimea and at sea in 2024 will depend on the readiness of Ukraine's partners to supply the necessary missiles.
Calls for Ukraine to adopt a defense strategy in the coming year are far from the optimism that abounded at the beginning of 2023 after Ukraine's resounding victories near Kharkiv and Kherson. While some observers will inevitably find this position pessimistic or even defeatist, it reflects the current realities of war and represents the most likely path to future success. Indeed, if Ukraine's transition to active defense in 2024 paves the way for a possible victory, future historians will consider it prudent and wise.
Vladimir Putin is openly preparing his country for a protracted war, and he is encouraged by signs of weakness among Ukraine's growing Western allies. To defeat the Kremlin dictator and end the threat posed by resurgent Russian imperialism, Ukraine and its international partners must stop thinking in terms of individual offensives and adopt a more long-term approach to this historic task.
