Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have documented that Russian forces have been concentrating their stockpiles of ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September to conduct large-scale combined strikes with hundreds of drones on selected days.
The ISW report notes that Russia does not always use missiles every day — instead, its logistics allow it to “stockpile” missiles almost daily and then launch them in large packages that accompany massive UAV attacks to suppress Ukrainian air defense systems. This tactic gives the Russians a higher chance of hitting critical infrastructure and individual targets.
ISW also notes changes in the ratio of types of ammunition: cruise missiles are now more often used in combined strikes, while ballistic missiles are used for pinpoint strikes on individual objects. According to analysts, ballistic missiles remain a means of "point" strikes, while cruise missiles and drones are tools for suppressing air defenses and mass destruction.
In September, ISW estimated that the Russians conducted only a few nighttime strikes with more than 10 missiles, and about once every two weeks, nighttime attacks with more than 40 missiles, highlighting a trend of periodic escalations in large packages between a series of smaller but regular drone strikes.
The consequences of these tactics have become apparent in a series of large-scale attacks in recent weeks: the August-September waves of strikes included raids with hundreds of drones and dozens of missiles that struck residential areas and energy infrastructure, causing casualties and extensive material damage. International and Ukrainian sources have documented a series of such massive attacks, sometimes among the most destructive since the beginning of the war.
ISW analysts also warn that the Russian command may purposefully select cities and energy infrastructure facilities that are not covered by the Patriot complex system to increase the likelihood of a successful hit. This approach makes it important to maintain the operational flexibility of Ukrainian air defense systems and prioritize the protection of the most critical facilities.
What this means for Ukraine: first, there is a growing need for timely rotation and replenishment of the air defense complex; second, it is critically important to strengthen operational interaction between air defense and intelligence systems to minimize the effect of massive strike packages; third, civilian infrastructure requires additional protection measures and preparation for potential new waves of attacks.
Experts advise closely monitoring military intelligence and ISW reports as one of the sources of the analytical picture, but emphasize that the scale of attacks and their composition can change quickly, so decisions on the placement and use of air defense assets must be flexible and operational.
