Since the end of last year, after the failure of the offensive, the Ukrainian army switched to strategic defense, which involves the construction of large-scale defensive lines. However, Kyiv faced serious problems in this regard.
"There were only knee-deep trenches and that's all", - serviceman Mykola describes the state of the engineering and fortification structures on the second line of defense, where his unit recently arrived in the East.
This situation is a general phenomenon, it became especially noticeable in February, when Ukrainian troops were forced to retreat from Avdiivka under pressure from the Russians. The fighters claim that there were no ready-made lines outside the city, which allowed the enemy to quickly advance to the west for almost 10 km.
The fighters themselves, military experts, analysts and politicians talk about the inadequacy, unpreparedness and even poor quality of the Ukrainian defense lines. The parliamentary opposition demands a report from the prime minister on the "failed fortification construction program" and an investigation into it.
Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announces the allocation of a record 20 billion hryvnias since the beginning of the year for the creation of defense lines and the intensification of these works.
After the publication of information about the deplorable state of Ukrainian fortifications, this process accelerated significantly. Every day, military units and regional administrations began to publish photo reports about the digging of trenches and the construction of dugouts, and a "non-public curator" from the authorities became the coordinator of this process.
First, it is necessary to understand what exactly the terms "defense structures" mean. These are military fortifications that are built near the contact line and at a certain distance from it.
Usually, the line of defense consists of three main parts.
The first is the "foreground", which can include minefields, barbed wire fences, anti-tank ditches and concrete obstacles - the so-called "dragon's teeth".
The second is the main line of defense, which consists of bunkers, dug-in earth defense points, trenches, earth shelters, dugouts and machine gun positions.
The third is a reserve line, as well as places for the placement of artillery guns.
An example of such a system is the "Surovikin line", which was built by Russian security forces in the occupied territory of the Zaporizhia and Donetsk regions in six months - from October 2022 to spring 2023.
Ukraine began building its defense lines in 2015 along the demarcation line in the East. However, they were not as strong and effective, and are not located in the areas where hostilities are currently taking place.
Viktor Kevlyuk, former commander of the Luhansk Operational Tactical Group and now an expert of the Center for Defense Strategies, explains that in his area of responsibility in the Luhansk region, engineering and fortification structures were erected along the Siverskyi Donets River.
"The front line of defense ran along the river, the second line of defense was built parallel to the Seversky Donets and perpendicular to the modern front line. Therefore, the question is: what is the use of this line today, if the direction of hostilities is from east to west, and not from south to north?" - said Kevlyuk.
There were no defensive lines along the entire state border with the Russian Federation in Luhansk Oblast. According to him, in some areas there were only platoon strongholds, and in others - only a concentration of reserves in the rear.
The lack of a defensive line on the border allowed Russian forces to quickly occupy most of Luhansk and push deep into the region during the initial phase of the 2022 invasion.
In many other areas of the front, especially in the south of Donetsk region, Ukrainian troops were forced to retreat from the first line of defense to the second under pressure from the enemy, but the third line of defense was not prepared.
According to a source from the command of the engineering forces, the defensive lines, which have been erected since 2015, proved ineffective at the beginning of a full-scale war, as the Russian army actually bypassed them and advanced deep into the territory in many areas of the front. Maryinka and Avdiyivka remained the last "old" lines of defense, which fell at the beginning of this year under the pressure of Russian troops.
Ukraine is now hastening to build a new line of defense, especially in the most critical areas, such as near Zaporizhzhia, in western Donetsk region, as well as near Kupyansk and along the eastern border with Russia.
However, the question remains open: why was it not started to build a new powerful defensive line in the first two years of the great war?
Interlocutors from the BBC of Ukraine note different versions of the reasons. This may be due to the chaos in the first months of the conflict, the limited financial resources of the state and the emphasis on offensive rather than defensive strategies of the Ukrainian government.
The main part of the work on the construction of defensive lines near the front is carried out by engineering troops, which are part of the Support Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In early March, President Volodymyr Zelenskyi replaced the commander of the Support Forces. Oleksandr Yakovets, chief of engineering forces, became the new leader.
According to reserve colonel Viktor Kevlyuk, there is currently a significant shortage of engineering units in Ukraine. This, in particular, is connected with their significant reduction in the early 2000s.
The expert explains: in the future, the commander of the operational command at the front has at his disposal a regiment of operational support of three battalions, but only one of them can carry out work on fortification, as it has the necessary equipment and machinery. According to Kevlyuk, this is not enough.
"To carry out a defensive operation in operational command, approximately 5-8 engineer battalions are needed, and we only have 1. Question: why are there no others? It is unknown," says Kevlyuk.
Another problem is that the process of arranging fortifications took place "from the bottom up", that is, each specific unit was responsible only for creating a line of defense in its area. In order to create something more reliable than ordinary trenches, it was necessary to constantly appeal to the higher command for the allocation of wood, concrete or equipment.
This led to the fact that the erected fortifications on each separate site were significantly different from each other and did not create a dense and continuous defensive line. This situation gave the Russian troops the opportunity to push the Ukrainian defense in "weak" areas and enter the flank of other units.
"This problem exists, but it is definitely not the fault of the engineering units," assures one of the Air Force officers serving in the Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces.
There is logic in this statement. Having announced the transition to "strategic defense", in December 2023 the Ukrainian authorities determined that the customers for the purchase of defense goods, works and services for the construction of fortifications are several departments at once. Their list is defined in the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of December 29.
Among them are the Ministry of Defense, the state special service of transport, local administrations and the state agency for the restoration and development of infrastructure. All these bodies should coordinate with each other during the construction of defense lines. But it often turns out the other way around, says an interlocutor from the engineering forces.
For example, local administrations in some cases do not provide the necessary assistance to the military, who are forced to hastily build fortifications near the battle line due to the lack of special equipment and materials.
Member of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense Serhiy Rakhmanin (the "Voice" faction) points out that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have the legal right to seize the necessary construction equipment for the construction of defensive lines, but this should be done through local military administrations.
"In practice, it looks a little different - if the military negotiates with the local authorities, they will give something, if they don't, they won't. And a very common answer is "you'll still lose it, break it, or it'll explode, so we won't give it to you." There are a lot of such cases," the deputy expressed his opinion in an interview with "Radio NV".
From his point of view, this problem is related to low "executive discipline" in Ukraine.
"It turned out that we don't have anyone who could really restore order," Rakhmanin believes.
It would seem that the Ukrainian authorities have finally found someone who will be responsible for coordinating these issues. The former deputy head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Kyrylo Tymoshenko turned out to be a rather unexpected person. Since March 1, he has been an adviser to the Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov.
Three sources, including representatives of the Office of the President and the Ministry of Defense, confirmed to BBC Ukraine that Tymoshenko is now responsible for the work on the fortifications.
The Ministry, responding to the request of the BBC, noted that the "main direction" of Tymoshenko's work is media and communications, the coordination of information policy in the Ministry of Defense and subordinate structures, as well as the construction of a "unified information agenda" in the Armed Forces.
The question of the extent to which the new adviser is related to the work on the construction of defense fortifications in the Ministry of Defense remains unanswered.
Also, Kyrylo Tymoshenko refused to confirm or deny his involvement in the fortification topic during the communication with the BBC. He noted that, indeed, he attended many meetings at the Ministry of Defense on various issues, but his main function was to advise the Minister on communications policy.
"It's good that it's being done," he commented on the question about the large-scale state program for the arrangement of defensive lines, avoiding a more detailed explanation of his role in this process.
Who is Kyrylo Tymoshenko? During the short time of his political career in Ukraine, he earned a rather controversial reputation.
He joined Volodymyr Zelenskyi's team during the 2019 presidential campaign. At that time, the 30-year-old media man was engaged in the production of advertising and campaign videos, television programs and owned an advertising agency.
From May 2019 to January 2023, Tymoshenko worked as the deputy head of the Office of the President, where he managed regional and media policy.
Before the Russian invasion in 2022, he was also responsible for the government's strategic program "Great Construction", which was spent on a large amount of money. Therefore, Tymoshenko himself came under criticism for their ineffective use.
Due to corruption violations during the implementation of this program, law enforcement agencies initiated criminal proceedings. Some of those involved, including the ex-head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration Valentina Reznichenko, were subjected to searches.
However, before Tymoshenko, the law enforcement officers did not have any questions about the "Big Construction". However, he later became an accused by the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption in another case.
According to the NAZK, in 2022, the OP's representative illegally used an expensive Porsche Taycan car, which was provided by acquaintances "for free use." Tymoshenko also "stayed for free" at the "Emili Resort" hotel complex in the Lviv region three times in 2022, and helped her subordinate go abroad on a "business" trip, which was actually a private one. However, last fall, the court rejected all the arguments of the NAKC and declared that Tymoshenko was innocent.
Regarding the construction of defense lines, the Ministry of Defense noted that the BBC monitors the construction of fortifications. This is handled by the coordination headquarters, which includes representatives of the ministry and the Armed Forces.
"The headquarters constantly interacts with the bodies that carry out the construction and the regional military administrations in the area of responsibility of which the construction is taking place", - it was reported in accordance with the request.
Defense works are being carried out in all directions, in all 14 identified regions. Information on the percentage of readiness of fortification structures was not provided, but it was emphasized that the construction terms were set as "as short as possible".
According to operational data, as of March 5, about 2 billion hryvnias of the allocated funds were used. However, the Ministry of Defense noted that the funding does not cover the general need for the full implementation of construction works.
