The situation at the front in the Kursk region remains tense, as Russian troops cannot make the desired progress in pushing Ukrainian forces out of this strategically important region. In the conditions of protracted battles and resistance of Ukrainian troops, analysts are focused on assessing Russia's opportunities to further strengthen its positions. One of the military experts, Konstantin Mashovets, tried to calculate how many additional forces Russia can mobilize for the Kursk area and what resources can be involved for this.
Recently, I was asked here what forces and means the enemy's command can attract to "stabilize" the situation in this direction, and in the future - to try to knock out the Armed Forces of Ukraine beyond its own border in the Kursk region.
So, let's try to figure it out if possible.
1. First of all, we are talking about the troops (forces) of the "Leningrad Military District" (LVO), also known as the "North" troop group (commander - Mr. Lapin).
For those who have forgotten, let me remind you:
- the 6th combined arms army (ZVA), as part of the 138th and 25th separate motorized rifle brigades (omsbr);
- 14th Army Corps (AK), as part of the 80th and 200th omsbr;
- 44th AK, as part of the 72nd motorized rifle division (msd) and 128th omsbr;
- 11th AK, as part of the 18th MSD and the 7th separate motorized rifle regiment (OMSP);
- 61st Separate Brigade of Marines (MP) of the "Northern Fleet";
- 336th regiment of MP "Baltic Fleet".
These are the formations and associations of the enemy's LVO, parts and units of which MAY appear "near Kursk" in the first place. Although in practice there are many problems of a "current" nature, which prevent this or significantly limit the ability of the Russian command of the appropriate level to bring the above-mentioned forces and means there in "full format".
This could be the use of the main constituent elements of the indicated forces and means in other operational directions, or a significant "shoulder" of the maneuver, which will have a negative effect on the terms of concentration and deployment, or the discrepancy between the actual state of their combat capability level and the complex and volume of tasks that the Russians will have to solve in the Kursk operational direction, moreover, without prior preparation or significant additional staffing of the air base and OVT, in the "on the go" mode.
For example, the battalions of the 200th omsbr are obviously now involved in the battle in the Kramatorsk direction, north of Chasiv Yar, so it will be difficult to completely withdraw them from there. Either the 14th AK, whose brigades are engaged in the Dnieper direction, or the 336th Infantry Regiment, which is one of the "main" units in the enemy's 5th ZVA range, are also "problematic" in this sense, and so further
That is, it is obvious that it is QUICK to assemble a unified and structured grouping of troops from the "regular" troops (forces) of the Military Forces "North" in the Kursk operational direction, which will be able to "solve significant tasks in terms of scope and depth" (for example, to displace the Armed Forces in general in the interim Sejm and Psel beyond the state border), the Russian command is unlikely to be able to IN THE NEAREST TIME.
In other words, at this moment, it can act in the Kursk operational direction as a kind of "saltwater" and exclusively to solve a limited range of tasks. For example, to hold certain areas and boundaries, cover important communications and infrastructure facilities, and generally try to hinder the process of growth and improvement of the Ukrainian bridgehead in Kurshchyna.
2. However, it will obviously not last very long. Over time, the Russians will begin to draw more and more troops there. They are STILL trying to do it. In my opinion, in the future, in the sense of the formation and deployment of an ADDITIONAL grouping of enemy troops in the Kursk operational direction, we should expect a certain "inter-operational" regrouping there of a certain set of Russian troops from the composition of the "West", "South" and "Vostok" military forces.
We are probably talking about the 1st Tank Army (TA), and most likely, about its 47th Tank Division (TD) from the Kupyan direction, the 3rd Army Corps (AK) as part of the 6th MSD and the 72nd omsbr from the Kramatorsk direction, or even parts and units of the 35th ZVA, from the Pologiv direction.
This development of events is evidenced by the recording of units of the 83rd Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (ODSHBR) and the 810th and 155th Infantry Regiments, which, as they say, were under the Russian command, which had ALREADY been transferred to the Sever Air Force Base. at the moment — at hand" and arrived in the lane of the "North" military aircraft clearly not to block the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk direction, but to increase efforts in the Vovchansk region. But, as far as I understand, the enemy will have to use part of these forces precisely in the Kursk direction, and not for "Vovchan assaults".
And again, in this sense, the Russian command will need to “puzzle” over what and how to replace, for example, the 47th TD, which, obviously, is currently playing one of the key roles in the “breakthrough to Oskol”, or somehow withdraw "extra" battalions of the 35th ZVAd brigades from the important Pologiv region, etc.
At most, in my opinion, if even the Russian command has some "additional" troops (forces), for example, as a result of forcing the next stage of the mobilization deployment, then most likely it will direct them not in the Kursk direction, but in the strip of its "Center" UV, which is now actively tearing "as far west as possible" in the Pokrovsky and Toretsk directions (with the latter, judging by everything, certain problems have ALREADY arisen).
