The Security Service of Ukraine and military counterintelligence have exposed a Russian “mole” in the ranks of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). The lieutenant colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who was recruited by the Russian Federation before the start of the full-scale invasion, was passing on important information to the enemy about plans for special operations in the southern direction. The agent’s detention was made possible thanks to joint counterintelligence actions and the personal participation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrsky.
Military counterintelligence and investigators of the Security Service, with the participation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Commander of the Special Operations Command, exposed an “activated” agent of Russian military intelligence. The perpetrator turned out to be a lieutenant colonel, commander of one of the Special Operations Command units, recruited by the occupiers even before the start of the full-scale invasion.
In the spring of 2024, a Russian GRU employee remotely “activated” an agent, tasking him with transmitting data on plans for Ukrainian special operations behind the front line. Of particular interest to the aggressor was information about raids by Ukrainian special forces in the Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Crimean directions.
Using his official position, the “mole” obtained data on the movement routes, weapons, and targets of Ukrainian fighters. The occupiers planned to use this information to destroy special forces both on the front line and in the temporarily occupied territories of southern Ukraine.
The agent also passed on data about other units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces to his Russian handler.
During the special operation, the SBU military counterintelligence gradually documented the traitor's crimes and detained him. In parallel, measures were taken to ensure the security of Defense Forces locations.
According to the investigation, the attacker was recruited by Russian military intelligence through acquaintances in the Russian Federation with whom he maintained contact.
During the searches, secret communication equipment, computer equipment, a mobile phone, and data carriers were seized from him.
The detainee was informed of suspicion under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine for high treason under martial law. He is currently in custody and may receive life imprisonment with confiscation of property. The special operation was conducted by investigators of the Odessa Department of the SBU in cooperation with the prosecutor's office.
