The conclusion of the military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko is striking: the cessation of Western aid is an almost impossible event, but he carefully considers three possible scenarios in the event of its occurrence, preparing for any possible difficulties.
In recent days, a number of Western publications and analysts began to publish materials devoted to the prospects of Ukraine in the war with Russia in the event of the cessation of aid from Western partners. We could already see something similar on the eve of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and after the invasion itself, when Ukraine was given 96 hours to contain the Russian army, then the deadline increased to several weeks and later forecasts to a month.
None of them have been confirmed. For the second year in a row, Ukraine not only successfully deterred Russian troops, but also managed to do what many analysts thought was unthinkable - to liberate part of the occupied territories. On the other hand, now the situation is somewhat different and against this background there are both positive versions of the development of events and completely apocalyptic ones, similar to the same 96 hours and several weeks.
A positive scenario
If we consider the positive scenarios, they are mostly based on the fact that during the war, the Ukrainian army managed to capture much more Russian equipment than was supplied to it by its Western partners. In Ukraine, there is even such a joke that the main Lend-Lease partner of Ukraine turned out to be the Russian army.
Indeed, according to verified, documented (photo and video) data, the Defense Forces of Ukraine (DFS) captured more than 2,900 units of Russian equipment. I would like to note that the verified data are not actual, and they always differ significantly to a lesser extent.
For example, Ukrainian troops captured 597 units of Russian tanks alone, including the most modern T-90s. In Ukraine, a whole company of T-90 tanks of the A/AK/S/M “Breakthrough” modifications was formed. More than 800 units of armored fighting vehicles (BBM) were captured! And so on…
But there is a very important nuance in this rainbow scenario, namely, the vast majority of trophy equipment needs repair, sometimes with the replacement of unique spare parts manufactured only in Russia, as well as ammunition. And therefore, in reality, only a certain part of the trophy equipment quickly replenished the composition of the SOU, the other part - after some time, and some part will never be able to be used for its intended purpose. And therefore, the trophy component should not be overestimated and given a value comparable to supplies of Western equipment.
Negative scenario
The negative scenarios that can be seen now are even more detached from reality than the positive ones. They refer to a very rapid decline in the defense of Ukraine and the capture of territories in an extremely short period of time. But the dilemma is that in most cases these scenarios are projected on the offensive capabilities of the Russian occupying forces as of February-March 2022, without taking into account the significant deterioration of these indicators today.
Russia lost its offensive potential in the war against Ukraine. If in 2022 Russian troops attacked Kyiv with a group of 40 thousand from the territory of Belarus, through the Chernihiv, Sumy and Kyiv regions, and were able to reach the capital of Ukraine, now a group of more than 40 thousand is trying to surround the small town of Avdiyivka for the second month, to which from the collision line (LBZ) had to be crossed from 1.5 to 2.5 km.
Even taking into account the decrease in the combat capability of the Russian SOU, these indicators will not change qualitatively, and they will by no means allow them to advance deep into the territory of Ukraine as quickly as two years ago.
And that's why the more realistic scenario of events, when the partners stop supporting Ukraine, looks somewhat different.
A realistic scenario
Before I describe a more realistic scenario, I'll point out that even that won't be true. Why? Because the support of Ukraine's partners will never completely stop, there may be temporary delays, but not a complete freeze on supply. However, let's consider this option. Currently, Russian troops use mainly the infantry component in the offensive. This is due to the lack of the mechanized component and its staff shortage. That is, if we talk about the Russian offensive under the above-mentioned scenario, then it will be carried out in the same way as on the entire LBZ.
In the absence of support from partners, the Ukrainian army will proportionally reduce the number of artillery shots per day from 5-7 thousand to 1 thousand or less. Own production of ammunition will be able to maintain this level, but will not provide all the needs of artillery in defense. This will allow the Russian troops, even with the predominant infantry component, to carry out the offensive more effectively.
It is also important to pay attention to the fact that throughout 2023, SOU regularly received from partners a range of tools that were practically unused. These are Javelin ATGMs, anti-tank NLAW and AT-4 and others. In addition, the production of the highly effective Ukrainian anti-tank missile "Stugna-P" and ATGMs to it continued.
But all these means were displaced from the LBZ by drones, which became a curse for Russian equipment. We can talk about sufficient reserves of these means, accumulated for fighting, both at close and medium distances with Russian equipment. That is, the problems for the mechanized component of the Russian troops, even with a decrease in the concentration of artillery fire, as they were and will remain.
However, the deterrence of the offensive of Russian troops will be questioned, and the defense potential of the SOU is expected to decrease. The main lines of defense will not be defense lines, but natural obstacles: rivers, lakes, areas controlled by the SOU of dominant heights, forest areas, as well as settlements with dense low-rise and high-rise buildings.
The Russian command will continue to seek, first of all, to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, and will also develop an offensive in Kharkiv region and with the prospect of reaching Dnipropetrovsk region. But taking into account the limited capabilities of the Russians to advance their infantry component and the consistently high losses in personnel, the exit to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, as well as to the left bank of the Oskol River along the Lyman-Borova-Kupyansk line, may take from six months to a year of active offensive actions
It is unlikely that the Russians will reach the right bank of the Kherson region under such conditions, but the question will be raised about the presence on the left bank of the SOU units, which have recently expanded their bridgehead along the coast. This bridgehead will be abandoned.
In the Zaporizhzhia region, the controlled zone in the Verbovoy-Robotyny region, achieved as a result of the summer offensive, will be lost. This may encourage the Russians to take more active actions in the region, and the Russian troop group "Zaporizhia" will launch an offensive on Orihiv and Gulyaipole. However, they will not have enough resources to reach Zaporozhye itself, taking into account the defense lines and frontiers formed in the region.
Be that as it may, the lack of help from international partners will have an extremely negative impact on the situation in the war zone, and within a year Ukraine will lose a number of territories in the east and south of the country. This can strengthen Russia's position in the geopolitical arena, and Moscow, against the background of the advance of its troops, will launch an unprecedented campaign to force Ukraine to negotiate on Russian terms.
In fact, the lack of help from partners will deprive Ukraine of the opportunity to form forces for counteroffensive operations, and the defense will be less reliable due to the lack of a full range of the necessary means. For their part, due to the predominant infantry component, the Russian troops will suffer consistently high losses, which will force them to carry out regular regrouping and replenishment of units, which will also affect the pace of their advance, which, if we talk about plans to capture the entire left bank, may take years.
But again, I repeat, such a scenario is possible only in the complete absence of help from the West, and this is an incredible option, which is mostly dreamed up by Russian propagandists, but does not at all correspond to the state interests of both the United States and the European Union. However, its consideration in advance allows the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the military-political leadership to prepare a plan of appropriate actions in case of a hypothetical crisis.
