In the war in Ukraine, nothing has been decided and nothing is over

Where to expect the fiercest battles and what military equipment will be of decisive importance for each side?

We analyze the prospects of hostilities and describe the general development of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the coming months.

Aviation factor

As a serious factor, the Russian aviation returned to the battlefield - it is no longer only about the actions of the Su-24 or Su-34 over Kharkiv or the border area of ​​Sumy Oblast, but also about the dropping of cast-iron bombs by the "Hrachami" Su-25 on Chasiv Yar - that is, directly on the line the front

Russian bombs often go off the rails, but most still reach their approximate target.

And now the Russians are limited not even by the number of boards, but by the number of corrected bombs.

It will not be possible to quickly and reliably prevent the threat from Russian aviation even if the first F-16s appear in the Armed Forces.

Russian pilots have more flying experience over many years, more experienced ground services than the quickly retrained Ukrainian ones, more airstrips in the European part of the Russian Federation.

And there are DRLC (long-range radar tracking) aircraft - although Ukraine shot down two of them and probably damaged several more during overhaul on the ground. But these sides will rise into the air when the struggle for the initiative in the sky begins.

Therefore, a quick response to the Russian aviation is hardly possible - squadrons of Western aircraft will arrive in Ukraine gradually, and pilots are trained during 10-month cycles. And these planes will also be introduced gradually.

But ambushing bomb carriers from low altitudes, shooting down cruise missiles and kamikaze drones that broke through Ukrainian air defense, conducting reconnaissance missions, “distributing” EW and carrying anti-ship missiles will still be better on Western aircraft with integrated helmet sights and on-board radars .

The F-16s are in any case significantly newer than the MiG-29s, which are currently used by the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Drones and strikes in the rear

Russian reconnaissance drones Supercam and Zala, which often work in the operational rear of the Armed Forces near the third line of defense, remain a threat from the air - they have new optics (perhaps Iranian) and are tied to an optical channel so as not to come under the pressure of EW.

It is behind their "eyes" that ballistic missiles arrive - "Iskanders" or their North Korean counterparts, often cluster ones.

This has happened before - for example, a strike in Pokrovsk on a train during loading or long-range strikes by "Lancets" on airplanes at airfields.

But recently, the number of strikes on the Ukrainian rear has noticeably increased.

"Flies" over overpasses, railway bridges and everything that looks like the location of Ukrainian troops.

Periodically, the Russians hit the same places repeatedly, so that there would be losses for the rescuers of the State Emergency Service.

Ukraine's post-Soviet anti-aircraft arsenal for Osa, Strela or Tunguska air defense systems with photocell-guided missiles or detonation of non-contact detonators near the target has shown itself well in this war against a variety of drones. But these thousands of missiles that reached Ukraine from the USSR are running out.

Similarly, the supply of Stingers is running out after the attacks of hundreds of cruise missiles, Shaheds, Orlans and other reconnaissance drones. What Ukraine still received can be roughly estimated at 5-7 years of production of these MANPADS by 2022.

At the same time, even the United States is now using "reverse engineering" and the restoration of decommissioned MANPADS to replenish warehouse stocks until new production reaches the planned level.

And while there is a shortage of air defense equipment, more and more Russian drones penetrate the tactical and operational rear of the Armed Forces and can guide high-precision weapons and ballistics.

Western aid

Western aid to Ukraine, despite political difficulties, continues.

It must be understood that the USA is not removing Kyiv from the balance sheet, despite the fierceness of its own internal political struggle. Therefore, sooner or later the question of American aid should be resolved - at least in the form of a loan with the possibility of write-off or with another mechanism.

At the same time, ammunition contracts are being concluded in the West, the production of "smart mines" is being resumed in Germany, and the 35x228 mm projectile plant for "Cheetahs" will reach its planned capacity in mid-2024.

In the same way, work is underway to localize the production of "Bayraktars" in Ukraine.

These drones have successfully proven themselves during a full-scale invasion and continue to be used for a variety of tasks.

Although under current conditions, they are still more effective as scouts-correctors or even as carriers of radars with AFAR, that is, as radar stations with an "active phased antenna array" - a device that can simultaneously monitor the airspace, make cartography and put electronic obstacles to the enemy. This is the type of modernization that the Poles are currently doing with Italian equipment.

There remains the "drone coalition", in which France, Germany, Britain and other heavyweight countries send hundreds of kamikaze drones and reconnaissance devices to Ukraine.

Europe is expanding the production of launchers for PATRIOT - Ukrainian batteries and the "European Sky Shield" (a project to strengthen the air defense of European NATO countries - Ed. ) will require capacities and specialists.

In addition, Poland, Germany, Romania, Spain and the Netherlands are going to buy up to 1,000 PAC-2 GEM-T missiles with the ability to "work" on ballistic targets with a non-contact detonator.

As for shells, there are prospects of receiving 1.5 million 155-mm ammunition from EU countries, in particular at the expense of the "Czech initiative".

At the same time, it is recalled here that in the 1990s, the US arsenals aimed at the war with the Soviet Union consisted of 10 million pieces of 155-mm shells - so, probably, these reserves can still be found.

Today, four countries in Europe produce 155 mm shells: Britain (BAE Systems), Germany (Rheinmetall), France (Nexter) and Finland together with Norway (Nammo).

For the Finns, for example, orders are scheduled six years in advance - you buy today, and the queue is calculated until 2030.

Volumes of all projectile manufacturers are growing significantly, investments are on the way.

And this is an indicator that European industry is actually working and preparing to work in support of Ukraine.

The latest aid packages from Germany are the best barometer of what is happening with Ukraine's partners - 130 Marder BMPs upgraded to the "1A3" version and several hundred drones went to reinforce the Armed Forces.

Russia's military industry

But at the same time, the Russians continue to mobilize their rear - in their news there are endless reports that former factories of Western companies in the Russian Federation have started producing gunpowder, and bread factories - drones.

Of course, such production will have defects, deadlines and other nuances.

However, equipment and weapons are still actively entering the Russian army.

Launching up to 500 Shaheds per month and 180 guided bomb strikes per day is also an indicator of trends in the war.

Videos of the equipment of the killed Russian soldiers appear on social networks - they have digital walkie-talkies, already good first-aid kits, night sights, ceramic plates of body armor, and knee pads. And this is in the infantry, not special forces.

There is a noticeable difference with the mobilized ones of the 2022 model with Esmarch harnesses.

The Russians are adapting to war while equipping their army.

In such conditions, Ukraine must "run to stay in place" with all its might.

The ability to mobilize the rear and wage a total war, rather than relying only on the resources of the EU and the USA, can mean a lot for the future of Ukraine.

After all, we are talking about fundamental things for Ukraine - not even about whose Vugledar or Tokmak will be. And about survival.

If Russia can advance deep into Ukraine, it will do so.

If the Russians can turn Kherson or Kharkiv into ruins with bombs from UMPK and rocket artillery, they will do it.

Missile strikes

The Russians' obvious plans for this summer campaign will be mass launches of strike drones and single-target ballistic volleys.

As it already happened with the Zmiivskaya or Trypilskaya TPPs, it is banal to exhaust air defense in one sector and hit a specific target with missiles, disabling it for many months.

The goal of the Russians here is to strike at the energy sector with an impact on the economy and the military-industrial complex of Ukraine at a time when it is beginning to intensify the production of its own weapons.

Moscow wants to influence this by disrupting the energy sector, since its winter campaign of shelling of scattered factories was less effective - Ukraine continues to produce long-range drones, maritime surface drones and self-propelled guns.

Directions of attack

Chasiv Yar and its heights are the gateway to Kostyantynivka and beyond to the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

The enemy there has the opportunity to hide in the ruins of Bakhmut and accumulate forces, as well as work from outside the city with bombs.

He will try to knock out the Armed Forces near Klishchiivka and force the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal.

The Russians did not abandon the plan to get out of the dense built-up here and further break out into the operational space.

And the offensive on Kupyansk is a struggle for logistics.

If the Armed Forces fight back there, it will be a threat to the Russian lines - it will be difficult to dig three lines of concrete fortifications in the surrounding forests.

Finally, the section of the Kreminna-Svatov front is an important artery, the "forecourt" of the railway branch to Starobilsk.

The Russians want to advance here so that the Armed Forces do not hit the railway with Hymars and drones.

The Russians are spending huge resources in attacks on villages and landings in this area and up to Kupyansk. They are trying to move the high-precision weapons of the Armed Forces of Ukraine away from the occupied railway.

In addition, the Russian army has tried to advance near Ugledar several times since last year, regularly leaving dozens of pieces of equipment there, including both T-72B3 tanks of the 2022 release and old T-55s.

That is, there will be a positional war in strategically important sectors - not only engineering fortifications will play a big role, but also the presence of military "gross product": mines, heavy infantry weapons, ammunition wagons.

How to prepare for the rear

That is why the mobilization of the Ukrainian rear will be important.

Perhaps it would make sense to ask the allies to set up and carry out vocational training reform (for example, students will study there in the first shift, and production for the military industry will take place in the other two).

Another option is decentralization and transfer of production to the suburbs. To organize the production of only hulls and castings at one enterprise, and of blasters at another, and assemble all this at dozens of small sites.

Another theoretical option is the transfer of production and the creation of jobs for Ukrainian refugees in Eastern Europe.

In general, military production in the conditions of war is quite real - during the Second World War, the Germans built up military equipment under the strategic bombing of the Allies and could produce hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs per year.

And then it was not about hitting 20 rockets a week - it was possible to do this during many months of bombardment of factories with dozens of direct hits on workshops.

And Ukraine now needs literally everything - "screwdriver" assembly of trucks, various ammunition, mines for mortars and guided mines, various palliative air defense launchers for air-to-air missiles adapted for launching from the ground, hundreds of long-range drones and dozens of missiles (for example, "Neptunes" for shooting not only at sea, but also on land).

It can be seen from the frontline videos that during the attacks of Russian tanks they are covered either with artillery fire or FPV drones, and there are not so many launches of ATGMs and anti-tank missile systems.

Although there are all conditions for them in the steppes. However, there are not so many reserves - and this is despite the large arsenals of the USA and EU countries.

But the "war of attrition" phase is such that anything can end.

Therefore, Ukraine should not depend on the internal politics of other countries, but do everything to produce as much as possible at home, to produce realistically.

And what cannot be done in Ukraine is to buy on credit, re-export and buy weapons from the Persian Gulf countries with a surcharge for urgency.

Russia really lost the "quick" war against Ukraine that it planned in 2022. But the Kremlin wants to either freeze the situation, work on the mistakes and try again.

Or it is banal to transfer the Armed Forces of Ukraine with its own resources on the battlefield - human waves and arrays of equipment.

At the same time, they are stockpiling missiles for strikes on the rear and housing.

And equipping new units - tank and artillery brigades and regiments (albeit based on outdated D-1 howitzers and T-55 tanks, but they are still weapons).

Moscow is set on a protracted campaign - perhaps the Russians will have enough equipment only until the end of the year (given the number of "golf cars" and other unexpected vehicles that they are currently using due to the lack of regular armored vehicles).

But the Kremlin seems to have put everything on the line in this war. And the Russians are ready to spend all their resources for years to come in order to occupy a maximum of Ukrainian territories.

Therefore, nothing has been decided and nothing is over in the war.

A difficult summer awaits Ukrainians.