In his column for The Hill, compares the current strategy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the tactics used by Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Gurewitz believes that analogies between tactics can give Ukraine an advantage in a war with Russia, especially when it comes to transferring hostilities to enemy territory.
Ukraine's bold invasion of the Kursk region led to a serious shift in the dynamics of the conflict between the two countries. In a conflict that has brought so much suffering to Ukrainians, the shocking move by the Ukrainian armed forces to begin fighting the enemy on its territory has energized their troops and citizens.
History sometimes teaches lessons from the past, and the Kursk offensive is reminiscent of Israel's equally bold move during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
In this war, Israel initially lost ground, being caught off guard by invasion from both the north and the south. On the holiest Jewish holiday, Syrian tanks rolled down the Golan Heights, and a coordinated Egyptian attack on the Sinai desert caught the Israelis by surprise.
The Arabs made considerable progress in their campaign. Never in the many wars waged against Israel was Israel exposed to greater danger.
After several days of terrible losses, Israel began to calm down and stopped the offensive. But something bold had to be done to turn the tide of the war. A strategy was developed to cross the Suez Canal and fight in Egypt.
Under heavy artillery fire, as well as bombing and strafing by Egyptian aircraft, General Ariel Sharon's troops crossed over and began to invade Egypt. The Israelis noticed the gap between the Second and Third Egyptian armies and began to implement a plan to isolate the latter.
When their plan began to work, the Egyptians and the international community went into a panic. The Israelis were able to destroy the Third Army because they cut off its supply routes and approached Suez, meaning the heart of Egypt and its capital, Cairo.
In Russia, the spread of the war to its territory reflects the first successes of the Israelis. Russia's sluggish response has alarmed the local population, more than 100,000 of whom are now internally displaced.
The Russians are in their element, fighting on fortified defense lines in southern Ukraine. But they are not very good at making dynamic changes on the battlefield, and resisting this new creative approach of highly motivated Ukrainian soldiers proved difficult. Russia is mobilizing troops and has promised to reverse the shameful success of the Ukrainian offensive, but in many respects the Ukrainians have already succeeded.
Moscow is only 300 miles from this front line. While few would think that Russia's capital would really be in danger, its proximity to the scene of hostilities has an effect. Perhaps this will be enough to turn the tide of the war and take the fight deep into Russia, as the Israelis did by crossing the Suez and threatening the heart of the Egyptian army and its major cities.
The Israeli offensive in Egypt changed the course of the war. Because Egypt was suddenly under such a concrete threat, the two superpowers—the Soviet Union, which supported the Egyptians, and the Americans, which supported the Israelis—both became concerned that they might be drawn into the war. The potential destruction of the Egyptian Third Army and the threat to Cairo turned calls for a truce into noise.
It is difficult to predict how this might play out in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but Ukraine has suggested that it might try to keep most of the conquered territory and agree to withdraw from it in exchange for Russia leaving the Ukrainian territory it seized.
Ukraine is showing signs of consolidating its gains in Kursk, and if it can fight back against an angry Putin and his beleaguered forces, this strategy could prove fruitful.
Putin is in a different position than Anwar Sadat, the then leader of Egypt. Sadat and Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad did the most to restore Arab pride after their humiliating defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War.
Once the military momentum was stopped and of course when they faced a real threat from an Israeli counteroffensive, a negotiated peace made sense. They shed Israeli blood and shook the Israeli arrogance that had developed after their success in previous wars.
But for Putin, such a peace could be his downfall. If he is pushed to the negotiating table by a successful Ukrainian offensive seizing Russian territory that Moscow cannot take back, it will shatter Putin's aura of invincibility—the blanket of fear that has suffocated his critics (though Putin's image has already been damaged by his protracted campaign against Ukraine).
The Russians are forced to select soldiers from an estimated 300,000 conscripts, but this is not the best strategy for Putin either. They are poorly trained, and they were promised that they would not be thrown into the flames of the Ukrainian conflict.
There are reports that the mothers were furious that their sons had been thrown into battle and felt betrayed. At one time, such aggrieved mothers played a role in getting the Soviet Union out of the quagmire of Afghanistan, which led to the fall of that empire.
War is often about measuring risk. If Russia is unable to stop the Ukrainian advance or push them out of the territory they hold, will Putin follow through on his threat to use tactical nuclear weapons? He might be tempted to consider it, though it would likely lead to a split in his vital alliance with China.
Putin's anger at his country's impotence could lead to more attacks on Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, although Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said one of the reasons for the invasion was to create a buffer zone and reduce Russia's ability to attack across the border.
Whatever the outcome, the Ukrainian offensive is a bold gambit that history has shown can be very effective when it comes to engaging an enemy and disrupting its strategy and military achievements.
