The threat to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk: what the Russian army can do in this direction

Of course, with the real aspirations of the Kremlin regime in the war in Ukraine, this is just an excuse. But, if you go down a little, to the military-strategic level, then the meaning and logic of such actions will also be quite clear.

The possible occupation by the enemy of the area of ​​the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, obviously, in this sense, will sharply worsen the situation of the SOU both in the Kharkiv region and in the Pavlograd-Dnipro directorate. That is, it will make the future prospects of Ukraine's war in general quite difficult.

However, when assessing the enemy's prospects for the ability to plan, organize and conduct a large-scale operational-tactical offensive operation in this direction, it is necessary to take into account a number of factors that directly affect these capabilities of our enemy.

They can be conditionally divided into two large groups - factors of a general (strategic) nature and factors determined by the specific situation in this direction.

The first group includes:

• the situation with the formation and deployment of the enemy's strategic reserves. I have already written about them, so I will not dwell on it in more detail. In short, the enemy's situation with this is quite, let's say, complicated. First of all, with the "technical factor" and, accordingly, with the "terms and deadlines". It is quite possible that not all strategic reserves of the enemy will be able to "take part" in the offensive operation;
• it is also obvious that the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation has so far failed to completely and "finally" stop the military-technical cooperation of Ukraine with a number of its allied countries, as a prerequisite for their "successful major offensive" this summer. Although, of course, the Kremlin managed to create significant difficulties in relations with our main ally (the USA);
• the Kremlin also completely failed to disrupt the process of further mobilization deployment of the Ukrainian army as a factor of the preliminary reduction in the ability of the Armed Forces to put up effective resistance in the specified direction(s), although, well, it did create very significant obstacles in this area. Last but not least, because of the large herd of "moles" and hidden "Kremlin sympathizers" who managed to entrench themselves in domestic structures and formations that are directly related to the measures of mobilization deployment in Ukraine. Another factor is the quite strange position of our top military-political leadership of the state in this matter, which clearly "profiled all the terms", it was necessary to move here sooner and more actively;
• it is obvious that in the sense of the operational deployment of its strategic reserves (which still need to be "finalized" properly) in this direction and in general, the preparation of the future area of ​​operations for its own large-scale offensive operation, the command of the enemy's troops will face certain difficulties. His current management system (first of all, at the operational level) clearly does not meet the future tasks (we will talk about this a little later). Moreover, the concentration and deployment of offensive groups is not as easy a task as it seems to some at first glance;
• it is also obvious that the hypothetical offensive operation in the direction of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk should be "connected" with a number of other steps at the strategic level. After all, by itself, it is unlikely to be able to fundamentally change the course of the war. Therefore, its influence and consequences, in this sense, the enemy will have to "significantly expand". First of all, by including it in his strategic planning (in other words, the enemy will need to decide in ADVANCE what he will conduct it for, what actions he will carry out as part of this offensive in OTHER directions, and what he will do after its "conditionally successful ” completion in the sense of its general strategy of warfare).

Portosiv's approach - "I fight because I fight" clearly will not work here. The enemy was already "near Slovyansk", occupying Izyum, and the attempt to "take Slovyansk" by force only because it was "necessary" had already ended for him in the Kharkiv pogrom. It is the reluctance (well, or the inability) to connect the meaning of one's actions in some operational directions with actions in others that leads to this kind of "pogroms"...

For the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk direction, this becomes even more relevant, because it is obvious that this kind of operation will require a sufficiently high level of interaction between at least two groups of the enemy's troops - "West" and "South" (since the operation will clearly take place\if on their adjacent flanks), while the main forces of the "Yug" air force are operating much further south of the indicated direction (exactly on Kurakhovsko-Vugledarskoe).

Now, regarding the specific situation in this direction.

The first, and in my opinion, the determining factor is the existence of the Siversky salient (well, or bridgehead, if someone likes it that way more) of the ZSU. In other words, the enemy simply will not be able to begin the practical solution of tasks in the Slov'nsk-Kramatorsk direction without first solving the "problem of the Siversky salient". This, in fact, is the main difference between this direction and Kurakhivsko-Vugledarskoye. As long as the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are 8 km from the western outskirts of the city of Lysychansk, the enemy clearly cannot hold the area of ​​the cities of Chasiv Yar, Kostiantynivka and the Lyman - Yampil line, "brothers" Kramatorsk or Slavyansk...

That is, the enemy command has two ways (methods) of conducting an offensive operation in the direction of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk - to make the problem of liquidation of the Siversky salient part of its general plan (and act accordingly in stages, first liquidating it), well, or try not to pay attention to this is to advance through Liman and Kostyantynivka, bypassing the agglomeration from the north and south-east and hoping to cut off our troops in the Siversky salient "a little later".

At the moment, the enemy by the forces of the "West" and "South" troop groups is trying, in fact, to create convenient preconditions for both options:

• conducts an offensive in the Limansk direction by troops (forces) of the 20th and 25th combined arms armies (ZVA), hoping, obviously, not only to displace our troops west of the Zherebets river, but also to "clear" the entire Serebryansk forestry;
• the forces of the "Yug" air force (2nd and 3rd AK + 98th Airborne Division\pdd) are persistently trying to break through to the town of Chasiv Yar and towards Kostyantynivka.

To date, the enemy is still very far from achieving these "intermediate" results. The battles at our bridgehead in the Zherebets river and to the west and south-west of the city of Bakhmut are "extremely fierce in nature." The rate of advancement of the enemy's advanced units in the indicated directions is such that the enemy cannot yet hope that they will "make it in time" (that is, in a certain time BEFORE the start of the operational deployment of their offensive groups)...

In fact, now the enemy's command (the "West" and "South" military units) are trying to occupy the most convenient areas for the operational deployment of their future offensive groups to conduct a hypothetical Sloviansk - Kramatorsk offensive operation. This is approximately:

• Zelena Dolyna – Kolodyazi – Liman – Drobysheve (for the northern face);
• Walls - Novodmytrivka - Kostyantynivka - Osykovo (for the southern face)

But he is not able to do that yet.

So far, the enemy cannot enter the specified areas and take them under their control...

As far as I understand, in the sense of carrying out any offensive actions in the direction of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the enemy command has a so-called "simplified" or "alternative" plan.

Its content consists in the gradual displacement of our troops from the Siversky ledge itself (exit to the Siversk-Zvanivka line from the east and southeast).

Units and units of the enemy's 106th Airborne Division (pdd) and his 2nd Army Corps (AK) from the 8th ZVA are currently "working" on this. Their latest attempts to advance on the village of Vyimka, in the direction of Zolotarivka - Verkhnokamianske, as well as to "clear" Bilogorivka (upper) clearly testify to this.

With a simultaneous breakthrough towards the city of Lyman from the east and northeast, which is what the troops of the 20th and 25th ZVA from the "Zapad" military unit are currently "working" on.

I understand that, according to the Russian command, this will also "bring it significantly closer" to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and create convenient "starting" conditions for organizing and conducting a wider offensive in the indicated direction.

Another decisive factor for the enemy regarding the conduct of a hypothetical offensive operation in the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk direction will be determining its scope and "depth of coverage".

And it is clear why exactly - this will significantly affect the volume and size of offensive groups that will need to be deployed in the respective areas.

In this sense, there are 2 options.

So to speak, the "maximum" program, with an attempt to cover (bypass) the area of ​​the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration as widely as possible - through Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and Svyatogorsk and Liman from the north.

Well, the "minimum" program is to simply "break" along the E-40 road through Pryvilya and Nikanorivka towards Kramatorsk, as well as clear the entire Serebryansk forestry and try to take Yampil and exit to Siversk from the north.

Both options will require the concentration of offensive groups of different scope and size.

If in the second case it will be possible to limit oneself to 1-2 motorized rifle divisions (msd), which will be used to strengthen the 25th ZVA and one ZVA, which will need to be deployed in the offensive lane of the northern part of the Yug military base, then in the first, according to the experience of Bakhmutska and Avdiivska operations, it will be necessary ADDITIONALLY, at least 2-3 combined armies and also to provide for certain troops (forces), for example, in the form of 1-2 MSD (well, or a whole AK) for supporting actions in the southwestern direction...

I, of course, assume that the enemy will build up "some" strategic reserves by the summer, but, once again, it is not a fact that they will fully acquire combat and operational capabilities. And then, it should be taken into account that in other operational areas as well - it is unlikely that "grace and grace" will come...