The further, the more freezing the war with Russia becomes the most likely scenario, says analyst Valery Pekar. Ukrainian society needs to figure out how acceptable this scenario is and what concessions can be made.
Describing the scenarios for 2024-2025, I noted that the inertial scenario (that is, the way everything is moving now) is the worst scenario for Ukraine of a war of attrition with the loss of Western support and, as a result, a significant loss of the ability to resist. But I did not call it the most likely scenario. And this is a rather unusual case, because usually the inertial scenario is the most likely. But when there are powerful forces that try to knock down the inertial scenario and switch to a better one, then the inertial scenario loses its probability. This is exactly what we have now.
I called the second scenario the most probable scenario — the scenario of freezing the war, which last year seemed completely impossible. After all, both Ukrainian society and Putin, who chose the first scenario of a war of attrition, were against freezing the war.
Three months have passed and now the air is beginning to smell of the second scenario. It still looks unacceptable to Ukrainian society and to the Russian leadership. But America and Europe really need him. European industry needs it to build up defense capabilities. European leaders need it to prepare their societies for change. Biden needs him to go to the polls as a peacemaker. Trump needs him to criticize Biden for his incompetence and to smooth over the failure created by the failed inter-party struggle. All Ukrainian politicians need him to hold elections and win (they all hope to win).
But even the two main opponents of this scenario cannot boast of unwavering position. Ukrainian society as a whole has not come to terms with the categorical necessity of mobilization. Politicians are delaying the adoption of the law, and we do not see the frantic pressure of society to speed up this process. The people who are at the front are not eternal and not iron, but even the voice of millions of their relatives cannot be heard against the background of a single marathon.
Likewise, Putin, although he continues his aggressive rhetoric, sends rather mixed signals. We do not know which of this is a disguise and which is real, because we do not know the real state of the Russian economy. We do not know whether the Kremlin believes that time is playing on their side or on us. We are not even sure who time is playing.
China is behind all this. Although he has a strategy of his own gain in all options for the continuation or termination of the war, we do not know whether he does not consider the gain from an armistice to be greater. It is very likely that it is, because he has economic problems, the solution of which does not contribute to the war.
Let me remind you that the scenario of freezing the war envisages the second phase of aggression in 3-5-7 years, after the restoration of Russia's capabilities and its study of the mistakes of the first phase. This means that the destructive impact of the second phase may be greater. For this, Russia and Ukraine must intensively prepare for this phase — Ukraine with the help of the West, Russia with the help of China. But the success of Ukrainian preparations depends on the results of the elections — the victory of the modernizers and the accelerated modernization of the army and state institutions can avert the second phase of the war, and the victory of the populists can lead to weak preparations and the loss of Ukrainian statehood, which is Putin's strategic goal.
Therefore, it is very likely that in the near future we will be inclined from various sides to freeze, calm down, truce, etc.
This means that Ukrainian society urgently needs an open and honest dialogue on three key issues:
1. Is it acceptable to freeze in the conditions when, on the one hand, Ukraine lacks weapons, mobilization slows down, there is a chance to hold elections, and on the other hand, Russia will break the truce at any moment, and in the USA the authorities can people determined to disarm Ukraine and Europe will come. In other words, who does time work for - us or the enemies.
2. If the answer to the first question is positive, then what red lines cannot be crossed under any conditions? Obviously, the list of red lines includes inadmissibility:
- any "demilitarization", because this is an invitation to continue aggression;
- rejection of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, because it would mean that 10 years have passed in vain;
- recognition of the change in the political status of the occupied territories, because this is a violation of the Constitution.
At the same time, some concessions will have to be made, and the red lines in society must be discussed for a long time and qualitatively.
3. If the answer to the first question is negative, then what should we as a society do so that the refusal of negotiations and the continuation of the war do not turn into the burning of lives and, in the end, into defeat, but lead us to victory.
And it is worth starting this public dialogue with a discussion of what victory is and what defeat is. It's not a single bit of information, it's not a black and white picture: between winning and losing lies a wide spectrum, including partial wins and losses, no wins and no losses. What do the words we use every day mean? Do all layers of society understand them in the same way? Where is the line between acceptable and unacceptable?
This is what we have to talk about in the near future.
